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Images of Women and Capital Sentencing Among
Female Offenders: Exploring the Outer Limits of
the Eighth Amendment and Articulated Theories of
Justicet
Introduction
[I]f I needed a cause, there were plenty of far more deserving people
out there to feel sorry for.'
And even within our concern for imprisoned women, why focus on
capital punishment when death row is roughly as open to women as
the United States Senate?2
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court declared the death penalty
unconstitutional in its landmark case, Furman v. Georgia.' The Court
cited concern over the death penalty's disparate and unpredictable applica-
tion as the grounds for its decision.' Historians looking back on this
period note that the Court, like the rest of the country, was affected by a
sense of awareness of those who had been traditionally underrepresented
t Special thanks to Professors Lynn Blais and Raoul Schonemann for their guidance and encour-
agement in preparing this Note. Thanks also to Professor Jordan Steiker, Jeff Kubin, and Marc
Vockell for their comments on various drafts. Finally, a very special thanks to Michael Muskat,
Frederick Solt, Tamara Serwer, and Madeline Vela Dvorocsik for their support and editing skills.
1. BEVERLY LOWRY, CROSSED OVER: A MURDER, A MEMOIR 10 (1992).
2. Joan W. Howarth, Feminism, Lawyering, and Death Row, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S
STUD. 401, 411 (1992) (book review).
3. 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam).
4. Id. at 255 (Douglas, J., concurring) (stating that the death penalty is "selectively applied,
feeding prejudices against the accused if he is poor and despised, and lacking political clout, or if he
is a member of a suspect or unpopular minority, and saving those who by social position may be in a
more protected position"); id. at 293 (Brennan, J., concurring) (concluding that the death penalty
"smacks of little more than a lottery system" in which punishment is inflicted arbitrarily); id. at 309-10
(Stewart, J., concurring) (calling the death penalty as cruel and unusual as being "struck by lightning"
and concluding that even if race is not a factor in the administration of the penalty, the death penalty
is still constitutionally intolerable because it is imposed "so wantonly and so freakishly"); id. at 313
(White, J., concurring) (condemning the death penalty because it is imposed so infrequently and with
no meaningful basis of distinguishing who gets it and who does not); id. at 365-66 (Marshall, J., con-
curring) (finding that "the burden of capital punishment falls upon the poor, the ignorant, and the
underprivileged members of society").
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in the political process.5 As the Civil Rights movement surged around the
walls of the Court, knocking down race- and sex-based barriers, how could
the Court not also attempt to make the ultimate punishment equitable? In
this context, Furman appears to be a logical extension of Brown v. Board
of Education,6 Sweatt v. Painter,7 and Frontiero v. Richardson.8 Four
years after Furman, the Court, perhaps mellowing in its judicial zeal as it
watched the tides of the Civil Rights movement divide and diminish,
retraced some of its Furman steps and upheld a series of post-Furman death
penalty schemes While the Court still clung to the ideals of equality
espoused in Furman, it was more willing to trust that states could be fair
in how they administered their capital sentencing schemes.
In 1984, twelve years after Furman, North Carolina executed Velma
Barfield, the only woman to meet this fate in the post-Furman era.'0
5. See WILLIAM H. CHA FE, THE UNFINISHED JOURNEY: AMERICA SINCE WORLD WAR I 150-55
(1991) (noting that Supreme Court decisions during the Civil Rights movement were not revolutions
themselves, but were merely an acceptance of the changing sentiment of the society).
6. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (overturning legal segregation of public schools on the ground that
the "separate but equal" doctrine violates the Equal Protection Clause).
7. 339 U.S. 629, 633-34 (1950) (finding that a legal education equivalent to that offered to white
students was not available to black students required to attend a segregated law school).
8. 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (holding that "classifications based upon sex, like classifications
based upon race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected
to strict judicial scrutiny," and overturning a federal law that placed procedural hurdles in the way of
female uniformed armed services members who wanted to claim their spouses as dependents for pur-
poses of receiving federal benefits).
9. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312-13 (1987) (finding that a study indicating racial
disparity in Georgia's imposition of the death penalty did not present a constitutionally significant risk
of racial bias and thus failed to establish an Eighth Amendment claim); Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S.
939, 948-49 (1983) (upholding a death penalty conviction despite the fact that the court had considered
an improper aggravating circumstance); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976) (upholding
Georgia's first post-Furman death penalty statute, which provided statutorily defined aggravators). This
is not to imply that the Court upheld all post-Furman death penalty schemes. See Maynard v.
Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356,359-60 (1988) (holding that having "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel"
as a statutory aggravator did not provide sufficient guidance to a jury in deciding whether to impose
the death penalty); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1986) (holding that the court had
improperly limited the mitigating evidence the defendantwas allowed to present); Godfrey v. Georgia,
446 U.S. 420, 428-29 (1980) (holding that the broad and vague terms in the statute at issue failed to
sufficiently narrow and channel sentencer discretion to avoid arbitrary and capricious application of the
death penalty); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 606 (1978) (concluding that the statute at issue did not
provide for the individualized consideration of mitigating factors required by the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 333 (1976) (holding that limiting the range of
offenses for which the death penalty could be imposed did not adequately respond to the harshness and
inflexibility of mandatory sentences); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293 (1976) (striking
do wn North Carolina's mandatory death sentence as "unduly harsh and unworkably rigid").
10. See James Reston, Jr., Invitation to a Poisoning, VANITY FAIR, Feb. 1985, at 82 (describing
the controversy in North Carolina created by the Barfield execution); Kathy Sawyer, Woman Executed
for Murder; 'Death Row Granny" Dies in North Carolina, WASH. PoST, Nov. 2, 1984, at Al,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Wpost File (reporting the execution by lethal injection of Barfield,
the first woman since the 1962 execution of Elizabeth Duncan in California to be put to death in a U.S.
correctional institution); see also Sam Howe Verhovek, Dallas Woman Is Sentenced to Death in Murder
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Barfield's execution brought the death penalty for women into the head-
lines, but only briefly. Recently, this topic has re-emerged. Women such
as Susan Smith,11 Darlie Routier,12 and Guinevere Garcia 3 have thrust
the question of women and the death penalty back into the spotlight of the
collective conscience, and yet a relatively small body of literature exists
discussing this intersection of women and the ultimate sentence. Feminist
scholars rarely write about women and the death penalty. They do write
about issues and phenomena that might affect or even explain women on
death row, 4 but these scholars generally do not choose women on death
row as their "cause." While the most superficial of Westlaw searches
produces a steady stream of literature on the death penalty," limiting this
search to female offenders produces only four articles.16 It seems that the
emerging bodies of literature on women and on the death penalty do not
often converge. This is unfortunate because the union of women and the
capital system provides a unique laboratory in which to examine feminist
theories of power and justice.
If capital punishment represents the extreme of the criminal justice
system, where society collectively defines the outer limits of unacceptable
of Son, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1997, at A7, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nyt File (noting that
although there were 49 women on death row in the U.S., only Bartfield had been executed since 1976).
11. See Rick Bragg, Susan Smith Verdict Brings Relief to Town, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1995, § 1,
at 16, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nyt File (chronicling the conversion of a singlejuror suppor-
ting the death penalty by the other 11 jurors, who favored a life sentence for Susan Smith, convicted
of the drowning deaths of her two young sons).
12. See Verhovek, supra note 10, at A7 (detailing the death sentence received by Darlie Routier,
who prosecutors alleged slashed to death two of her three sons and then injured herself in an attempt
to disguise the incident as the work of outside intruders).
13. See DonTerry, Hours Before Execution She Sought, Illinois Woman Is Given Clemency, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 17, 1996, at AI0, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nyt File (reporting Governor Jim
Edgar's grant of clemency to Guinevere Garcia only hours before her scheduled execution for the 1991
shooting of her estranged husband).
14. See generally JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF
IDENTITY (1990); MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTEREDMOTHER, THESEXUAL FAMILY AND
OTHER TWENTY CENTURY TRAEDIES (1995); RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON
ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY (Toni Morrision ed.,
1992); CAROL SMART, LAW, CRIME, AND SEXUALITY: ESSAYS IN FEMINISM (1995).
15. For example, 411 articles mention "death penalty" or "capital punishment" in their titles
alone. Search of WESTLAW, JLR database (Apr. 1, 1997) (search for records containing "death
penalty" or "capital punishment" in Title (TI) field).
16. Search of WESTLAW, JLR database (Apr. 1, 1997) (search for records containing the terms
"female" or "woman" in addition to either the term "death penalty" or "capital" in the Title (TI)
field). See Thad Rueter, Why Women Aren't Executed: Gender Bias and the Death Penalty, 23 HUM.
RTS., Fall 1996, at 10; Lorraine Schmall, Forgiving Guin Garcia: Women, the Death Penalty and
Commutation, 11 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 283 (1996); Victor L. Streib, Death Penalty for Female
Offenders, 58 U. CIN. L. R-v. 845 (1990); Victor L. Streib & Lynn Sametz, Executing Female
Juveniles, 22 CONN. L. REV. 3 (1989); see also Joan W. Howarth, Deciding to Kill: Revealing the
Gender in the Task Handed to Capital Jurors, 1994 WIS. L. REv. 1345; Howarth, supra note 2;




behavior, then trends among female capital offenders should be expected
to point to the outer limits of socially unacceptable female behavior. This
Note explores the effect on women of this process of demarcating bounda-
ries of unacceptable behavior within the context of a capital punishment
system. Additionally, this Note explores the Eighth Amendment implica-
tions of these boundaries within capital jurisprudence. Part I examines the
two most prominent theories put forth by feminist scholars to explain
sentencing patterns among female capital offenders-the "chivalry theory"
and the "evil woman" theory. These theories attempt to account for both
the limited use of the death penalty for women and the presence of certain
women on death row. In Part II, this Note considers the limited empirical
data available from women's capital punishment trials and attempts to
ground the theories discussed in Part I in the practical realities of these
cases. This Part considers the characteristics of death-sentenced offenders
with an eye towards the constitutional restrictions on the imposition of the
death penalty. It considers traits used in sentencing women and examines
the extent to which they are "gendered" in women's trials.
In Part III, the Note considers current death penalty jurisprudence,
focusing on the theory of justice articulated in Eighth Amendment juris-
prudence and the constitutional restrictions on mitigating and aggravating
circumstances this jurisprudence utilizes in reaching its goal of a nonarbi-
trarily applied capital system. It then applies those theories of justice to
women's cases and draws three conclusions. First, many of the character-
istics that are recurrent in "death eligible" women, such as a lack of
femininity, aggression, poor mothering skills, or sexual promiscuity, are,
under current Eighth Amendment doctrine, at best questionable and at
worst inappropriate considerations that contribute to the death penalty's
arbitrary application towards women. Second, women may have trouble
finding relief for this arbitrary application of the death penalty under the
current burdens of proof. Third, while relatively few women are sentenced
to death, the effect of such sentences are far-reaching, serving to set outer
limits for all women's behavior.
The Note concludes by questioning whether the death penalty can be
constitutionally applied to women in light of constitutional and larger
sociological questions surrounding the application of the death penalty to
women. The Note's focus on the sentencing patterns apparent in women's
capital trials is not intended to imply that only women suffer under the
capital system, or even that women suffer under this system to a greater
extent than men. Rather, it highlights the differences between women's
and men's experiences in the capital punishment system and the constitu-
tional implications of these differences.
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I. Feminist Explanations of Women's Capital Sentencing Patterns
Literature examining capital punishment sentencing among female of-
fenders has produced two interrelated theories to explain sentencing trends.
Dubbed the "chivalry" and the "evil woman" theories,1 7 these explana-
tions focus on how prosecutorial discretion in capital trials and jury
reluctance (or willingness) to sentence women to death are affected by
society's perceptions of women.18 While these theories cannot boast the
extensive statistical and historical support that theories explaining race- and
class-based sentencing enjoy, they do raise critical and interesting questions
about the capital sentencing of women.
Subpart A of this Part explores the chivalry theory as a possible
explanation for the relatively small number of women on death row. Sub-
part B examines the evil woman theory as a possible explanation for the
women who do receive death sentences. Subpart C critically examines
both theories in an effort to test their usefulness in accounting for women's
experiences in the capital punishment system. Finally, subpart D considers
the ramifications of these theories in the context of post-Furman constitu-
tional reform of the capital punishment system.
A. The Chivalry Theory
The following excerpt from a petition delivered to the warden of the
San Quentin penitentiary provides an excellent example of the chivalry
theory. The petition was signed by thirty male inmates, who offered to
draw straws to go to the gas chamber in Eithel Spinelli's place if the
Governor of California refused to commute her sentence.19
[Tihat Mrs. Spinelli's execution would be repulsive to the people of
California; that no woman in her right mind could commit the crime
charged to her; that the execution of a woman would hurt California
17. Rapaport, supra note 16, at 508, 513 (discussing both the chivalry and evil woman theories);
see also ANN JONES, WOMEN WHO KILL 63-128 (1996) (discussing the general historical emergence
of the chivalry theory); Ilene H. Nagel & Barry L. Johnson, The Role of Gender in a Structured
Sentencing System: Equal Treatment, Policy Choices, and the Sentencing of Female Offenders Under
the United States Sentencing Guidelines, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 181, 189 (discussing the
chivalry theory); Irene H. Nagel & John Hagen, Gender & Crime: Offense Patterns and Criminal Court
Sanctions, in 4 CRIME & JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 91, 112-15 (Michael Tonry &
Norval Morris eds., 1983) (discussing the chivalry theory as a possible explanationfor the female sen-
tencing trends). The chivalry theory is sometimes also referred to as the "paternalism" theory, and
both terms are used interchangeably throughout the literature. See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Moulds, Chivalry
& Paternalism: Disparities of Treatment in the Criminal Justice System, in WOMEN, CRIME, AND
JUSTICE 277, 283 (Susan Datesman & Frank R. Scarpitti eds., 1980); Rapaport, supra note 16, at 512.
18. Rapaport, supra note 16, at 506 (noting that although capital punishment statutes do not clas-
sify by gender, the chivalry and evil woman theories contend that "gender bias infects the
administration of capital punishment" including the "discretion of prosecutors, juries and judges").
19. See id. at 501.
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in the eyes of the world; that both the law and the will of the people
were against the execution; that Mrs. Spinelli, as the mother of three
children, should have special consideration; that California's proud
record of never having executed a woman should not be spoiled °
The chivalry theory seeks to explain the most striking characteristic
of women in the capital punishment system: their relative scarcity.21 It
identifies as one explanation the gender stereotype of women as the
weaker, more passive sex, both submissive to and dependent on men.'
This stereotype has multiple effects. Generally, it creates a more protec-
tive attitude toward women.' In the context of the criminal justice
system, women's weak and passive nature makes them less attractive, if not
less eligible, candidates for imprisonment.2' The relative dependence of
women on men translates into a diminished culpability and an increased
possibility of rehabilitation.' Placed in the context of capital sentencing,
this chivalrous attitude towards women manifests itself in a cultural reluc-
tance to sentence women to death.' Viewed in its theoretical context, if
20. See id. (quoting CLINTON T. DuFFY, 88 MEN AND 2 WOMEN 135-36 (1962)).
21. See id. at 504 (noting that the chivalry theory explains the relatively scarce number of women
on death row as a by-product of the American society's "chivalrous disinclination to sentence women
to die").
22. See id. at 516 (explaining that women are seen as "less responsible" for their actions than
men, and therefore less culpable for their crimes).
23. One need not look far for examples of this protectiveness. It is readily apparent in everything
from social attitudes that do not allow women to fight on the front line during wars to penal statutes
that codify male protection of female "virtue" in the form of statutory rape laws. See, e.g.,
CATHERINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 161-62 (1989).
24. These effects of protective stereotypes on female sentencing trends, both inside and outside
the context of capital punishment cases, were examined by Angela Musolino. See RITA J. SIMON &
JEAN LANDIS, THE CRIMES WOMEN COMMIT, THE PLINISHMENTsTHEY RECEIVE 62 (1991); Nagel &
Johnson, supra note 17, at 187-88 (both citing Angela Musolino, Judges' Attitudes Toward Female
Offenders 16 (1988) (unpublished manuscript)).
In her interviews with judges, Musolino noted an underlying chivalrous attitude toward women
voiced by manyjudges. See SIMON & LANDIS, supra, at 62; Nagel & Johnson, supra note 17, at 187
(both citing Musolino, supra, at 15). One of the manifestations of this chivalry was that the judges
expressed a reluctance to incarcerate women. See id. at 188 (citing Musolino, supra, at 16). An obser-
vation from one judge epitomizes this reluctance: "I don't think there's any rational or objective thought
about it, but there's a feeling that incarceration for a woman is far more degrading than for a man, and
you'll never see them (women) back because they'll do everything they can to keep from going back."
Id. (citing Musolino, supra, at 16).
25. See Nagel& Johnson, supra note 17, at 188 (suggestingthat judges view women as being less
responsible for their crimes, as better subjects for rehabilitation, and as less acceptable subjects for
incarceration).
26. See Streib, supra note 16, at 877-78. Streib wrote:
Even when all of the specific aggravating and mitigating factors are the same for male and
female defendants, females still tend to receive significantly lighter sentences in criminal
cases generally. Judges admit that they tend to be more lenient toward female offenders
in general. Also, juries generally tend to be more lenient toward female offenders, parti-
cularly in serious crimes, for a variety of ingrained, cultural reasons .... This tendency
1418
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the death penalty serves as the ultimate sanction to vindicate violations of
the values and rights society chooses to protect, a scarcity of women on
death row would seem to indicate the tradeoff women make between full
moral, social, and legal stature and certain social protections.27 Elizabeth
Rapaport defines the end result of this tradeoff as "deep cultural inhibitions
against the deliberate killing of women, even women who have been
convicted of heinous murders. "28
A statistical examination of individuals on death row would seem to
substantiate a reluctance to execute women, as the chivalry theory
predicts.29 Of the approximately 19,000 documented executions in the
United States since 1608, only about 520 have been of women?0 While
executions of men continue at a steady pace, 31 trends in women's execu-
tions indicate a decline both in sentencing and execution, with only one
woman executed since 1973.32 One commentator estimates that one in
eight persons arrested for murder is a woman, but only one death row
inmate in eighty is a woman.33 Accordingly, male murderers are over
twenty times more likely to receive a death sentence than female
murderers.' Considering similar evidence in Furman v. Georgia, Justice
is consistent with the extraordinarily low number of death sentences and executions of
adult female offenders in our history.
Id.
27. See Rapaport, supra note 16, at 508 (noting that "[tihe impression that women are spared
death, despite our gathering commitment to sexual equality, is indicative of the conviction, deep in the
culture, that women will continue to lack full moral, political and legal stature, and that they gain
certain protections in exchange for accepting these limitations").
28. Id. at 503.
29. See Victor L. Streib, American Executions of Female Offenders: A Preliminary Inventory of
Names, Dates and Other Information (3d ed. Apr. 6, 1988) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Texas Law Review) (providing statistical information and analysis about individuals on death row and
noting the relative scarcity of women in comparison to men); see also Victor L. Streib, Capital
Punishment for Female Offenders: Present Female Death Row Inmates and Death Sentences and
Executions of Female Offenders, January 1, 1973, to June 30, 1995 (July 17, 1995) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Texas Law Review) [hereinafter Streib, Inmates and Executions] (providing
demographics about females on death row and stating that the number of death-sentenced females and
their execution rate is small in comparison to men).
30. See Streib, Inmates and Executions, supra note 29, at 2.
31. NAACP LEOAL DEFENSE AND EDUC. FUND, INC., DEATH Row U.S.A. 2 (Summer 1996)
[hereinafter DEATH Row U.S.A.] (stating that since 1976, 334 men have been executed with that rate
steadily climbing).
32. See Strieb, Inmates and Executions, supra note 29, at 2 (noting that while the post-Furman
annual rate for death sentences among female offenders has remained constant at around five per year,
of the nearly 300 post-Furman executions, only Velma Barfield, a serial arsenic poisoner executed in
1984, has been female). Currently, 49 women are awaiting execution in the United States. See DEATH
Row U.S.A., supra note 31, at 1.
33. See Rapaport, supra note 16, at 503 (noting that of 2,347 death row inmates in the U.S., only
30 are women).
34. See id. at 505; BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE
NATION ON CRIME & JUSTICE 46 (2d ed. 1988) (providing reports from the FBI Uniform Crime
Texas Law Review
Marshall acknowledged the gendered disparity in the risks of the death
sentence.35 He went so far as to rank gender discrimination with race and
class discrimination as reasons that the death penalty is offensive to the
American society.36 Marshall wrote:
There is also overwhelming evidence that the death penalty is
employed against men and not women. Only 32 women have been
executed since 1930, while 3,827 men have met a similar fate. It is
difficult to understand why women have received such favored
treatment since the purposes allegedly served by capital punishment
seemingly are equally applicable to both sexes. 7
In short, the chivalry theory accounts for the scarcity of women on death
row in terms of traditional, protective notions of femininity, which make
it difficult for juries to view most female offenders as "death eligible"
despite the fact that these women may be committing admittedly heinous
crimes.
B. The Evil Woman Theory
Despite a general reluctance to sentence women to death, forty-nine
women are currently on death row in the United States.38 The mere
presence of these women on death row indicates that under certain
circumstances-or with certain individuals-prosecutors, juries, and judges
will sentence women to death. While it is difficult to draw meaningful
conclusions from the limited statistical pool of executed and sentenced
women, it is possible to engage in informed speculation based on the evi-
dence that is available. The evil woman theory draws on this evidence to
suggest what combinations of facts will subject women to capital
punishment.
Examining the histories of women executed since colonial times,
Victor Streib concluded that executed women, not unlike other candidates
for execution
tended to be very poor, uneducated, and of the lowest social class in
the community. Their victims tended to be white and of particularly
protected classes, either children or socially prominent adults....
Most of the executed females manifested an attitude of violence,
either from past behavior or present acts, that countered any
presumption of nonviolence.39
Reports which show that 12% of persons arrested for murder or nonnegligent manslaughter in 1988
were female, and that men were suspected of felony murder 16 times as often as women).
35. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 365 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
36. Id. at 364-66 (Marshall, J., concurring).
37. Id. at 365 (Marshall, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
38. See DEATH ROW U.S.A., supra note 31, at 1.
39. Streib, supra note 16, at 878.
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In this description, Streib could have been describing nearly any population
on death row. The question for feminist scholars is whether these traits
assume any gender connotations outside of their applicability to women.
Streib himself concluded that these traits do appear different when dis-
played by female defendants: "[P]erhaps most fatally for [female
defendants], they committed shockingly 'unladylike' behavior, allowing the
sentencing judges and juries to put aside any image of them as 'the gentler
sex' and to treat them as 'crazed monsters' deserving nothing more than
extermination."' Arguably, this process of dehumanization must occur
for any defendant to receive the death penalty. But by his comments,
Streib raised larger questions of the process through which women are
dehumanized. He suggested that political and social forces require women
to be set outside of their protected status, or defeminized, before they can
be executed.41
The evil woman theory seeks to explain the execution of women in the
context of this larger sociopolitical grounding. The theory is premised on
the recognition that the death penalty serves as a tool of social cleansing,
allowing citizens to collectively punish and vindicate violations of the rights
and values society protects.42 Women who commit crimes heinous
enough to become eligible for the death penalty violate two socially
protected value systems. First, like their male counterparts, they offend
the collective sense of humanity with their crimes. Second, they offend the
collective sense of femininity with their "unladylike" behavior.43 Having
committed these social taboos, they relinquish the benefits and protections
afforded their sex and become "evil incarnate. '"I In this new role such
40. Id. (footnote omitted). Streib went on to state, "Indeed, their crimes and behavior could be
characterized as more like those of male killers than female killers, perhaps removing them from the
normally protective constructs for female offenders." Id. at 879.
41. See id. at 879-80. Joan Howarth also suggested that this process of dehumanization is neces-
sary in order to justify execution. See Howarth, supra note 2, at 416. She stated that because women
are traditionally characterized as "care givers," it is more difficult to separate women from their
humanity than it is to separate men from their humanity. See id. at 414-15. As a result, Howarth pre-
dicta that fewer women will be executed, with only those women who completely defy traditional
images meeting a capital fate. See id.
42. See Howarth, supra note 2, at 412, 414 (referring to execution as a "powerful symbolic act"
in which the society reclaims power from those who violate the social order).
43. See Deborah W. Denno, Gender, Crime, and the Criminal Law Defenses, 85 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 80, 86 (1994) (stating that violent female offenders are considered "doubly deviant" by
society-"defying both the law and their gender role").
44. See Rapaport, supra note 16, at 512-13 (stating that, under the evil woman theory, when a
woman is perceived as guilty of a severe or "male" offense, she loses the advantages of her gender and
is more harshly punished because of her violation of gender stereotypical expectations); see also Denno,
supra note 43, at 157 (stating that women may be more severely punished for unstereotypicalbehavior);
Schmall, supra note 16, at 287 (concluding that Guinevere Garcia was more harshly punished for kil-




women are not only eligible for the death sentence, but there is social
pressure to execute them. 45
Fundamentally, the evil woman theory claims that women who act so
violently or in such gender-defying or forbidden ways are denied the sanc-
tuary of their sex and are eligible for execution.4s In this sense, women
must transcend notions of femininity, either through their actions or reac-
tions to their crime, in order to become death eligible.' Joan Howarth
explains the existence of an inherent conflict between social images of
womanhood and images of the "death eligible" defendant: "[There] is [a]
bad fit between commonly understood images of what it means to be a
woman and the symbolic role of the person being put to death....
[W]hat it means to be a woman does not match what it means to be a
person deserving of execution. "4
Further, the evil woman theory suggests that when women cease to
behave in a manner warranting protection, their execution serves multiple
social goals.49 First, it provides a mechanism for keeping not only soci-
ety members in check generally, but also for keeping women who stray
from gender expectations in check. In explaining this principle, Howarth
defines capital punishment as a control of social power:
The execution is a ritual by which law-abiding people reclaim power
from criminals .... Capital punishment converts persons who have
(usually) committed terrible crimes into symbolic, ritualized objects
of sacrifice. This symbol of evil is eradicated to make us feel as
though we are doing something powerful in the face of
overwhelming, frightening acts of violence. The victimizer becomes
the victim.'
45. See Denno, supra note 43, at 157 (concluding that female offenders in general may be more
harshly punished than their male peers becausejudges and juries see them as "defying" their traditional
gender roles); id. at 92 (stating that "because society places stricter cultural constraints on female
behavior, females who become delinquent or violent appear to deviate more significantly from the
norm," thereby "traversting] a greater moral and psychological distance than males" (citations omit-
ted)); Rapaport, supra note 16, at 512-13 (stating that adherents to the evil woman theory contend that
women who violate gender norms by committing highly severe offenses are treated more harshly than
men). In this sense, women may be more harshly punished for less severe crimes if those crimes
appear especially contrary to traditional gender expectations.
46. See Howarth, supra note 2, at 415 (noting that women who are executed must first be stripped
of their gender identities because of their violence); see also Rapaport, supra note 16, at 503 (stating
that the execution of women is not only rare, but that it also challenges traditional notions of female
sanctity).
47. See Sheila M. Brennan, Popular Images ofAmerican Women in the 1950's and Their Impact
on Ethel Rosenberg's Trial and Conviction, 14 WoMEN's RTs. L. REP. 43, 43-44 (1992) (claiming that
Ethel Rosenberg was easy to execute not only because of the nature of the crime she committed, but
also because she failed to react to the charges against her in the expected manner).
48. Howarth, supra note 2, at 414.
49. See id. The concept that the death sentence carries sociological as well as constitutional
implications for women will be discussed at greater length in subpart mJ(D).
50. Id. at 414 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 75:14131422
1997] Capital Sentencing Among Female Offenders 1423
In this context, the execution becomes a means to ensure that citizens of
society, both men and women, adhere to certain expectations. Howarth
argues that, in the context of female offenders, these expectations take on
gender connotations so that even seemingly nongendered traits become
redefined in terms of womanhood." The presence of a capital system that
punishes "evil women" forces all women to adhere to traditional gender
expectations because the system appears to have a vested interest in harshly
punishing deviant women in an effort to "cure them of their deviance. "52
Furthermore, the execution of socially deviant women provides a means for
society to further define gender roles by setting an outer limits of its
expectations in the rubric of the criminal justice system.53
The use of the death penalty to eradicate deviant women carries with
it race and class implications. In United States history, two thirds of
executed female offenders have been African American.' Executed
females also "tend to be poor, undereducated, and of the lowest social class
in the community."' Under the evil woman theory, if part of what it
means to be a woman is to be protected from the death penalty, the
womanhood of those executed must be "invisible before the law."5 6
Considering the disproportionate number of executed women over history
who have been women of color57 and underclass women, it seems that
images of "appropriate women," or at least those deserving the protection
of their gender, are actually images of white, privileged womanhood. 9
51. See id. at 414, 413-14 (arguing that the relative lack of women on death row is partly because
of the "bad fit between commonly understood images of what it means to be a woman and the symbolic
role of the person being put to death").
52. See Victoria Mikesell Mather, The Skeleton in the Closet: The Battered Woman Syndrome,
Self-Defense, and Expert Testimony, 39 MERCER L. REv. 545, 561 (1988) (concluding that women who
commit crimes are viewed as maladjusted, and therefore there is a general social benefit to harsh
punishments as a means to correct not only individual deviance, but to prevent the risk of widespread
social deviance).
53. In criminal law theory, "[the concept of general prevention.., includes the moral or socio-
pedagogical influence of punishment." Johannes Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of
Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 949, 950, 949-51 (1966) (emphasis omitted). Andenaes suggests that
the power of a punishment system is its ability to define acceptable social behavior and then to force
citizens to adhere to that standard of behavior regardless of whether they agree with the moral message
suggested by the sanction. See id. at 967, 982-83.
54. See Streib, supra note 16, at 866 (noting that, in the past 350 years, two-thirds of executed
females were black). But see id. (noting that the percentage of black women executed in the twentieth
century is lower than it was in the past).
55. Id. at 878.
56. Howarth, supra note 2, at 417.
57. See Streib, supra note 16, at 857 (finding that 230 black women have been executed out of
398 confirmed female executions in American history).
58. See Howarth, supra note 2, at 417.
59. See id. It is possible that the phenomenon of race and class bias against female offenders in
capital punishment cases carries with it a secondary issue of whether the very term "woman" implies
someone who is white and a part of the middle or upper class. Is it easier for our society to execute
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In this sense, women of color suffer an additional bias because they are
viewed first through the lens of their racial or ethnic identity and then
through the lens of "perfect womanhood" they can never achieve.
Trends in sentence commutation also suggest that the death penalty is
used to define the outer the limits of womanhood. Women are more likely
than men to have their death sentences commuted or reversed.' It can
be argued that these trends in commutation both reflect gender stereotypes
surrounding the potential for rehabilitation and influence the goals of
rehabilitation to be more consistent with these stereotypes. Women are
viewed as more susceptible to rehabilitation than men.61 Informed by this
perspective, prison rehabilitation programs seek to remold the female
offender toward traditional womanhood.62 Looking at prison rehabilita-
tion programs in one state, Joan Howarth commented that "[m]uch of the
life [of a woman on death row] is an almost infantilized parody of
compelled feminine culture: cooking, sewing and service to others."'
women of color or poor women because they are considered somehow from the outset to be individuals
less deserving of the protection traditionally afforded to their sex because they do not fall within the
neat stereotypes of their gender? This argument seems especially compelling in the case of African-
American women executed as slaves, and later African-American women sentenced to die in Southern
states. See id. at 414-17.
Death penalty sentencing may also carry with it significant sexual orientation implications.
Victoria Brownworth points out that 17 of the 41 female death row inmates are lesbians, and three were
sentenced in 1992 alone. See Victoria A. Brownworth, Dykes on Death Row, ADVOCATE (Los
Angeles, Cal.), June 16, 1992, at 62. Victor Streib also suggests that sexual orientation may serve as
a factor to encourage execution. He states that prosecutors try to "defeminize" defendants by por-
traying them as lesbians-even when they are not. See Rueter, supra note 16, at 11.
It is unclear that a willingness to dehumanize based on sexual orientation is limited to women.
Arguably homosexual men run the same risk of execution as women for their violation of sexual orient-
ation expectations. For a discussion of this possibility, see David R. Dow, Teague and Death: The
Impact of Current Retroactivity Doctrine on Capital Defendants, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 23, 60
(1991) (citing Burdinev. State, 719 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 940
(1987)). Dow tells of a Texas prosecutorwho used the defendant'shomosexualityas the reason to sen-
tence him to death. The prosecutor told the jury that they should give the defendant the death penalty
because the defendant was gay. He stated: "Don't just send him to prison for life. The defendant is
homosexual, and we all know what goes on inside of prisons, so sending him there would be like
sending him to a party." Id.
60. See Rapaport, supra note 16, at 515-16 (noting the trend in sentence reduction among female
capital offenders due to commutation or reversal); Streib, Inmates and Executions, supra note 29, at
4 (stating that of the 107 death sentences for female offenders since 1973, 64 of these sentences have
been reversed or commuted to life imprisonment, one has ended in execution, and the remaining 42
sentences are still pending appeal).
61. See Streib, supra note 16, at 875 (commenting that there is a "perception among sentencing
judges that women are better candidates for rehabilitation than are men").
62. See Dermo, supra note 43, at 158 (noting that many prison rehabilitation programs are
designed to re-teach femininity to womenwho havefailed to fulfill their feminine role); Howarth, supra
note2, at 410.
63. Howarth, supra note2, at 410 (citations omitted) (examiningTexas's rehabilitation programs,
which are relatively typical of other states' programs, in which women on death row are encouraged
to write to their families, plant flower gardens, arrange the flowers grown, sew various items of
clothing and "parole pal" dolls, and attend regular religious meetings).
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These rehabilitation programs reward female offenders with sentence
commutations when they cease to appear as deviants deserving of social
condemnation in the form of execution and re-emerge as weaker, less culp-
able, and more traditional women who are deserving of social protection
and sympathy."
C. Turning a Critical Eye to Feminist Theories
Taken together, the evil woman and chivalry theories seem to neatly
explain women's experiences in the capital punishment system. These
gender-based explanations, however, are not flawless. Arguably, the chiv-
alry and evil woman theories "gender" too much. "Gender-neutral" fac-
tors can account for women's experiences as readily as gender-based fac-
tors. First, consider that the very nature of women's crimes tends to make
them less likely to receive the death penalty.' While one in eight alleged
murderers may be female, only six percent of suspected perpetrators of fel-
ony or capital murders are female.' In light of the fact that eighty per-
cent of offenders on death row have been convicted of felony murder,67
the fact that so few women commit felony murders becomes significant in
assessing any trend among female capital offenders.
Second, the nature of the felony murders that women do commit also
appears to preclude them from death eligibility. While women were sus-
pected of killing nearly the same number of their spouses and children as
men, 6 8 regardless of the sex of the defendant, intrafamilial homicides
usually do not give rise to capital sentences unless the killing was for
monetary gain or involved additional aggravating circumstances.69 Intra-
familial homicides can be viewed as less "death eligible" under two dis-
64. See id.
65. See Rapaport, supra note 16, at 509 (stating that "[tihe fundamental reason why so few women
murderers are death sentenced is that women rarely commit the kinds of murders that are subject to
capital punishment"); cf. Darrel J. Steffensmeir, Assessing the Impact of the Women's Movement on
Sex-Based Differences in the Handling ofAdult Criminal Defendants, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 344, 346
(1980) (noting that "most female arrests for serious crimes are for petty larceny, usually shoplifting,
for which offense neither male nor female defendants are apt to be sent to prison").
66. See Rapaport, supra note 16, at 509 (citing FBI SUPPLEMENTARY HOMICIDE REPORTS).
67. See id.
68. See id. (noting that, from 1976 to 1987, 11,690 women and 16,793 men were suspected of
killing spouses, lovers, and ex-spouses while 2,524 mothers and 3,265 fathers were suspected of killing
their children). It should be noted, however, that although nearly the same number of women kill
spouses and children, nearly half of the women sent to death row were placed there for killing inti-
mates, and this percentage is much higher than the percentage of men placed on death row for killing
their intimates. See Elizabeth Rapaport, Capital Murder and the Domestic Discount: A Study of Capital
Domestic Murder in the Post-Furman Era, 49 SMU L. REV. 1507, 1516-17 (1996).
69. See Rapaport, supra note 68, at 1514 (noting that there mustbe additional aggravating circum-
stances in order to place domestic killers at risk of a capital sentence); see also id. at 1518 (theorizing
that women on death row for murdering intimates are not really convicted for domestic murders, but
for economic murders with intimate victims).
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tinct, gender-neutral theories of the death penalty. Under a model of the
death penalty as a means to punish the most egregious of murderers, while
some intrafamilial murders cross the line of atrocity because of their viola-
tion of familial trust, most intrafamilial murders are viewed as less blame-
worthy because they often lack the qualities of cold-bloodedness or
predatoriness. Alternatively, under a view of the death penalty as a
means to remove the most dangerous members of society, because most
intrafamilial murders occur as a result of passion and in response to some
specific provocation, the threat posed by those who commit these murders
is limited.71
Third, in addition to the less death-eligible nature of their crimes,
women also tend to have less extensive criminal records than their male
counterparts, again diminishing their eligibility for the death penalty on
nongender grounds.' These factors-the nature of women's crimes
coupled with women's relatively sparse criminal history-certainly suggest
that traits beyond gender play into the probability that women will receive
the death sentence.' In fact, they suggest that society's need or will to
control and punish deviants does not stem from gender notions of justice
or vindication, but from the general premises of humanity and the value of
sanctions, including the death penalty, to serve as a deterrent. The
implications of this evidence have led some feminist scholars to suggest
that an "equality" theory is perhaps a more accurate model than the chiv-
alry and evil woman theories.7'
The equality theory argues that women are not "spared" death because
of chivalrous attitudes in society, but rather are only sentenced to death
70. See id. at 1518-19 (arguing that all domestic murders are crimes of passion, a traditional miti-
gator in death cases); Schmall, supra note 16, at287 (noting that intrafamilial homicides are considered
less heinous than murders of strangers).
71. See Rapaport, supra note 68, at 1518-19.
72. See Denno, supra note 43, at 83 (stating that men are more likely than women to engage in
violent crime and to have more extensive criminal records in general); Rapaport, supra note 16, at 506,
510 (noting that a woman's lack of a criminal record would serve as a mitigator, possibly allowing her
to escape a death sentence); Streib, supra note 16, at 874-75 (noting that a previous criminal record
can be used as an aggravator or a mitigator during the sentencing phase of a trial).
73. It should be noted in this discussion of gender-neutral traits that many feminist theorists would
argue that such factors are not gender-neutral at all, but are direct manifestations of differences in the
ways men and women are socialized and stereotyped. See, e.g., Rapaport, supra note 68, at 1518-19
(arguing that women's crimes are "'common' crimes made spectacular by the sex of their perpetrators"
who violate their traditional role of nurturer and supporter). The fact that women are taught to be less
violent and less confrontational in their everyday lives in turn leads them to commit less violent crimes.
In this sense, these factors are simply manifestations of the protection and encouragement of women's
traditional roles and social demeanor. Fora more complete discussion of behavioral effects of different
socialization models, see CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982).
74. See Rapaport, supra note 16, at 512-13 ("Mhe 'gender equality' theory... is that women
who, perhaps contrary to gender norm expectations, commit high severity offenses, are treated no
differently than men.").
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when they commit especially heinous or atrocious crimes.' This theory
accounts for the scarcity of women on death row by pointing to the fact
that women are less likely to commit such egregious offenses. 6 It con-
cludes that those women who pose, or are perceived as posing, a threat
tantamount to other death row inmates are sentenced to death. This parity
in sentencing demonstrates an absence of gender bias in the sentencing
system. 77 At least one researcher, Elizabeth Rapaport, suggests that the
equality theory is the most accurate given the limited trend information
available. She notes that the stories of the women currently on death row
actually mirror those stories of men in similar positions, suggesting
that women are equally, not more harshly, punished for violent
transgressions.78 In addition, the theory points to the fact that gender-
neutral traits serve as aggravators in capital statutes, further suggesting a
lack of gender bias in the construction and application of the death
penalty. 79
Although the equality theory may appear gender neutral, it is not
immune from bias, either. Rapaport suggests that "when a woman is
perceived as guilty of a severe or 'male' offense she loses the advantage of
her gender and is more harshly punished because of her violation of
stereotypical gender expectations."' Thus, the equality theory may
represent the worst of both worlds for women, subjecting them to both the
"rigors of equality and the detriments of the widespread suspicion of
privilege."" In this sense, the equality theory appears less as a gender-
neutral counter to the chivalry and evil woman theories and more as a
potential middle ground.
Finally, critics of the chivalry and evil woman theories' underlying
premise that the death penalty is a means of behavioral control argue that
any larger social implication of tendencies to execute "evil women" is
limited as a means to control women's behavior because so few women are
executed, and those that are do not possess significantly more heinous
character traits than their male peers.1 In this sense, the execution of
75. See id. at 502, 510-11.
76. See id. at 509-10.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 510-11 (noting that women appeared to receive equal treatment in sentencing, but
cautioning that only tenuous conclusions should be drawn from such a limited pool of cases).
79. For an analysis of the nongendered language of statutory aggravators, see Marianne Popiel,
Note, Sentencing Women: Equal Protection in the Context of Discretionary Decisionmaking, 6
WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 85, 103 (1979-1980). Popiel suggests that despite the apparent gender neu-
trality of sentencing schemes, factors used in such schemes may affect men and women differently in
their application. Id.
80. Rapaport, supra note 16, at 512-13.
81. Id. at 509.
82. See, e.g., id. at 510-11; Streib, supra note 16, at 878 (both noting that conclusions about the
reasons women are sentenced to death are beyond the capabilities of current research, in part, because
of the small statistical pool).
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women serves no more a social role as the foil for women's behavior than
the execution of any citizen, male or female. Indeed, the rarity of
women's executions would tend to indicate that they are not useful, or
used, as a means to control female behavior or to enforce gender
expectations.
This critique, however, ignores the basic phenomenon that the chivalry
and evil woman theories seek to address: although both men and women
are sentenced to death for heinous and atrocious crimes, it is impossible to
separate the gender implications from the women's sentencing.' Even
considerations that seem gender neutral on their face take on gender
significance in their application to female offenders. Although statutorily
defined aggravating factors may not expressly mention gender as an appro-
priate consideration, they do include considerations that may carry different
weight in the trials of men and women." The weight of such factors as
the future dangerousness, the impossibility of future rehabilitation, or the
cold-bloodedness of the act may hinge on the prosecutor's and sentencer's
preconceived social perceptions of the individual they are to sentence.85
In addition, the relatively small number of women executed does not
diminish the force of capital punishment as a social enforcer of values. An
execution represents more than a single act or criminal sanction. It is a
social process whereby limits on unacceptable behavior are demarcated.86
Its power is drawn from its symbolism.' This process of designating cer-
tain behavior acceptable and other behavior as punishable by death may
well punish men and women for the same violation, but the very nature of
83. See Schmall, supra note 16, at 286-87 (concluding that a capital defendant's fate is shaped by
gender expectations that are so intrinsically linked to the defendant that it is impossible for him or her
to avoid them).
84. See Streib, supra note 16, at 874 (noting that although none of the death penalty statutes
expressly lists the gender of the defendant as a factor to be considered in sentencing, they include con-
siderations "which may tend to apply with different weight to male and female offenders").
85. See id. at 874-78. It should be noted that much the same argument could be made of race or
class bias. The probability that a jury will consider a defendant dangerous in the future, capable of
rehabilitation, or otherwise deserving of death may well hinge on each juror's perception of that defen-
dant in the context of any or all of the juror's social biases and prejudices. See id.
86. The criminal justice system defines behavior that is unacceptable to society on a continuum.
At one extreme is the boundary between acceptable and unacceptable behavior, where minimal
punishments, fines, or even warnings are administered. This Note focuses on the other end of the spec-
trum, which involves the outer limits of unacceptable behavior-behavior that is so unacceptable that
the individual will not even be permitted to continue to exist.
87. See Howarth, supra note 2, at 412-14 (stating that execution is powerful for its symbolism as
a reclamation of power from criminals); Rapaport, supra note 16, at 517-18 (suggesting that the fact
that we continue to cling to the death penalty, realizing its flaws, suggests that its power rests in its
symbolism as a final means to silence offenders); Christopher J. Meade, Note, Reading Death
Sentences: The Narrative Construction of Capital Punishment, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 732, 760, 760-61
(1996) (concluding that support of the death penalty can be explained, in part, because of the symbolic
role it plays "to create order in a world filled with chaos").
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women's execution is to set the outer limits for acceptable behavior of
those like the executed women.8" The infrequency of execution may well
limit its usefulness as an active means to control behavior, but it does not
limit the social perceptions that it feeds on and perpetuates.8 9
D. Ramifications of the Theories
Acceptance of the evil woman and chivalry theories carries with it
implications for every woman's life. The death penalty, under the chivalry
and evil woman theories, becomes more than a means of punishment; it
becomes a means to enforce and dictate women's roles and images within
society. In this sense, the punishment carries with it serious power impli-
cations. Although women may enjoy a type of sanctuary from the death
sentence, these theories raise the question: at what price?
The chivalry and evil woman theories carry subtle constitutional impli-
cations for capital sentencing as well. These theories call into question
the ability of the judicial system to turn a gender-blind eye on female
offenders in capital cases. They question whether it is possible to separate
a woman's gender identity from her criminal identity. If gender stereo-
types that inform both social notions of the punishment process and the
individual to be sentenced are so pervasive that even in nongendered forms
they carry different implications for men and women, is it realistic to ask
a jury to separate an unfeminine woman from an unfeminine crime? Or is
the reality of certain immutable traits such as sex and race that they cannot
be separated from the criminal for questions of guilt or sentencing? Even
if these traits are separable for the guilt-innocence phase of the trial, is it
possible to consider gender-neutral aggravators in the sentencing phase of
women's trials? These questions carry Eighth Amendment concerns,
particularly in light of post-Furman constitutional requirements of enu-
merated, limited aggravating circumstances and post-McGuatha trends
towards bifurcated adjudication in capital cases in an effort to eliminate, or
at least reduce, bias and arbitrary application in the capital system.'
Before beginning a discussion of the collision of death penalty juris-
88. To some extent, the execution of any offender-male or female-carries with it implications
for all members of the society. In addition to these general, nongendered lessons, the execution of
women carries explicit, gender-specific implications, defining what it is to be both a good citizen in
general, but also what it is to be a good woman. For a general discussion of theories of punishment
as a means to dictate social lessons, see Andenaes, supra note 53, at 949-51 (arguing that criminal law
is an institution that inflicts punishment and creates propaganda in order to create conformity and
develop respect for certain societal values).
89. This is not to imply that every "evil woman" is executed or even that it is the goal of the crim-
inal justice system to curb female nefariousness with execution, but the implications of a penalty
designed to deter by harsh example must include its effect on gender expectations and roles.
90. See McGuathav. California, 402 U.S. 183, 221 (1971) (holding that there is no constitutional
requirement of a bifurcated trial).
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prudence and these feminist theories, it will be helpful to consider the
historical examples of women who have received the death penalty in an
effort to examine how the two theories presented come into play in the
practice of capital sentencing.
II. The Theories in Play: Cases of Women
The evil woman and chivalry theories predict that "death eligible"
women possess certain characteristics that allow them to be placed outside
the normally protective boundaries of womanhood. Several theorists have
attempted to draw conclusions about sentencing trends among female
offenders based on the sparse empirical data available. Victor Streib
provided a statistical breakdown of women executed in America. 91
Elizabeth Rapaport attempted to provide more depth to her sentencing trend
analysis by providing brief character sketches of American women exe-
cuted in the twentieth century. Authors such as Sheila Brennan and
Lorraine Schmall provided the most complete picture of an executed
woman by focusing solely on one woman's experience in the capital system
and attempting to draw conclusions from her anecdotal experience. 3 This
Part of the Note examines their general conclusions and places them in the
context of the chivalry and evil woman theories as a means of testing the
theories' predictions about the characteristics of death-eligible women and
the power implications that can be drawn from their sentencing.
A. Death-Eligible Women
By Victor Streib's tally, 398 women had been executed in the history
of American capital punishment.' Of these women, 274 (76%) were
executed for their role in a homicide.95 The next closest group is com-
posed of the 27 women (7%) executed for witchcraft, with crimes ranging
from arson to petty treason completing the statistics.9 Of the 398 women
91. See Streib, supra note 16 (offering statistical analysis of executions of women in the United
States from 1632 to 1989 and focusing on specific characteristics of the offender and the victim such
as age, race, socio-economic background, and geographical region of the crime).
92. See Rapaport, supra note 16, at 516-54 (analyzing female executions in two groups: pre- and
post-Furman).
93. See Brennan, supra note 47, at 43 (drawing conclusions regarding women's images in the
1950s from Ethel Rosenberg's execution); Schmall, supra note 16 (examining the capital experience
of Guinevere Garcia).
94. See Streib, supra note 16, at 848. Currently, 3,104 men and 49 women are on death row.
See DEATH Row U.S.A., supra note 31, at 1.
95. See Streib, supra note 16, at 852 tbl.2 (setting forth the number and percent of women exe-
cuted for each known category of criminal conviction as of December 31, 1989).
96. See id. (listing attempted homicide at 21 (6%); arson at 20 (6%); theft at 5 (1%); burglary at
3 (1 %); rebellion at 3 (1 %); conspiracy at 2 (1 %); and adultery, assault, attempted arson, banishment,
espionage, and petty treason each at 1 (less than I %)). Streib also lists 37 executions for which the
crime is unknown, bringing the grand total to 398. See id.
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executed, 189 (47%) were slaves. 97 Like the larger pool of women, these
women were executed primarily for homicide.98 Of these homicides, 67
(61 %) were committed against a member of a slave-owner's family and 6%
were committed against the offender's own child." Of the 39 executions
that have occurred in the twentieth century, white women compose the
largest racial group at 66%, followed by black women at 34 %."° This
trend toward executing white women is relatively recent, with black women
composing 66% of the total executions and white women only 31%. 11
Of all the decades examined, the 1930s was the high-water mark for execu-
tions of both men and women in the United States, with 1,667 persons
executed."° Of this rather amazing number, only 11 were female. 3
Only one women has been executed in the post-Furman era, but some
67 different women have been sentenced to death."° White women com-
pose the majority of this group of sentenced, though not necessarily
executed, women at 45; black women follow at 16. The remaining women
are either Native American or of unknown racial origin. 5 All 70 of the
post-Furman death penalty sentences are for murder."
Despite these ranges in the demographic characteristics of the
offenders and the types of crimes they committed, there are points of
commonality. Women have been executed from coast to coast in a total of
thirty-four states and three federal jurisdictions. 7 As individuals, these
women tend to be poor, uneducated, and of a low (if not the lowest) social
class. 08 They tend to display dominant personalities and are often por-
trayed (where records exist) as "aggressive, self-willed killer[s]."'-
97. See id. at 853 thl.3.
98. See id. (listing homicide as the underlying offense for 72% of female slave executions).
99. See id. at 854 tbl.4 (setting forth the number and percentageof women executed for each cate-
gory defined by the offender's relationship to the victim); see also id. (demonstrating that other unre-
lated victims or unknown victims constituted the other 44 deaths).
100. See id. at 856 tbl.6.
101. See id. Women were executed in the greatest number in the 19th century, particularly toward
the end of the century, with 198 women executed, 157 (83%) of whom were black. See id.
102. See id. at 857.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 867. Streib points out that three women were actually sentenced to death twice,
bringing the grand total of female death sentences to 70. See id. It should be noted that these numbers
do not include Darlie Routier, a white woman from Texas who was sentenced to death for the murder
of her son on February 4, 1997. See Verhovek, supra note 10, at A7.
105. See Streib, supra note 16, at 870 thl.15.
106. See id. at 868.
107. See id. at 866 (noting that although women havebeen executed across the country, the execu-
tions are concentrated in the Northeast and Southeast, with Virginia emerging as the leader, executing
93 women).
108. See id. at 878.
109. Rapaport, supra note 16, at 516; see also Streib, supra note 16, at 879 (noting the dominant
roles these women assumed in their crimes and characterizing their crimes and behavior "as more like
those of male killers").
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They were all active participants in the crimes that brought about their
sentences, even if they were not the principal actors themselves. 110 A
high percentage of these women killed family members or lovers, and
almost all killed someone who was well known to them.' Exceptions
to this trend include Ethel Rosenberg, who was executed for
espionage,' and the twenty-seven women executed for witchcraft.'3
These statistics are for the most part in keeping with what adherents
to the evil woman and chivalry theories would predict. All of the crimes
described could certainly be categorized as unladylike behavior. In addi-
tion, the women's role both as propagator of violence and as a dominant
figure counters traditional images of passive womanhood. At first glance,
the frequency with which women are sentenced to death for murdering an
intimate may seem surprising. If one of the goals of the death penalty is
to punish those who may pose a future danger, arguably women's violence
against intimates should spare them the death penalty because their crimes
appear victim specific and, therefore, the women pose a slight risk for
recidivism. This initial surprise may be overcome, however, when one
considers that the act of murdering someone lulled into trust by a false
image of womanhood may well seem more disturbing and deceitful than a
random act against a stranger or even an acquaintance.1 4
Despite the apparent support these statistics provide, they supply a
sparse picture of the type of woman who is death eligible. Indeed, they
offer the observer only limited insight into the underlying question of the
chivalry and evil woman theories: under what circumstances will women
110. See Brennan, supra note 47, at 46, 52 (observing that Ethel Rosenberg was only accused of
typing notes to assist in the espionage ring of her husband Julius, although media accounts claimed that
she was a mastermind of espionage); Rapaport, supra note 16, at 516 (noting that the women executed
either did the killing or, if acting in concert, were "at least fully the peer[s] of [their] collaborator").
111. See Rapaport, supra note 16, at 559; Streib, supra note 16, at 851. Despite this tendency
to execute women for the murder of intimates, it should be noted that women who kill their own child-
ren rarely get sentenced to death. See Verhovek, supra note 10, at A7. Currently, only five women
are on death row for the deaths of their own children. See id. (quoting statistics from the Death
Penalty Information Center).
112. See Brennan, supra note 47, at 46; Rapaport, supra note 16, at 525.
113. See Streib, supra note 16, at 851 tbl.2 (pointing out that the majority of people executed for
witchcraft were women, with 20 executions occurring in Massachusetts, six in Connecticut, and one
in Maryland). More historical exceptions would include the women convicted of nonfatal crimes such
as arson or theft and a woman who was executed in Massachusetts on June 1, 1660 for refusing to obey
an order banishing all Quakers from the Massachusetts Bay Colony. See id. at 852.
114. A perfect example of this phenomenon comes in the case of Darlie Routier, who was sen-
tenced to die for the murder of her five-year-old son, Damon. See Verhovek, supra note 10, at A7.
Despite Routier's protestations of her innocence and her family members' pleas for her life, the jury
was apparently persuaded by the prosecutor, who characterized Routier's act as cold blooded and
warned that "anyone who could brutally slash her two young children and then repeatedly lie about the
crime was capable of committing further violence" and therefore posed a continuing, significant risk
to the community. Id.
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be executed? Every day poor, undereducated, and marginalized women
commit crimes. A limited number commit death-eligible crimes. A more
limited number still commit especially horrendous crimes likely to shock
social sensibilities with their raw violence and unrepentance. And yet, only
sixty-seven women in the last twenty years have received the ultimate sen-
tence. Given the fact that the death penalty does not execute all women
who commit horrendous crimes, it does not seem unreasonable to assume
that the penalty is more selective than the statutes would indicate.
Elizabeth Rapaport attempts to provide better insight into the select-
ivity of the death penalty by providing anecdotal accounts of women
sentenced to death since the turn of the century."u Looking only to
Rapaport's post-Furman analysis, nine women were sentenced to death for
committing murder in the course of armed robbery; 16 fifteen women
were sentenced to death for killing family members or other intimates, with
twelve of these women killing for pecuniary gain;117 two women were
sentenced to death for killing policemen or corrections employees;1 . five
women were sentenced to death for murders committed with male accom-
plices on other women or children that involved rape, sexual abuse, or
torture of the victim; 9 two women were sentenced to death for com-
mitting crimes at the behest of dominant husbands;"2 and two women
were sentenced to death for "mass murders." 21 Each of these women
committed the unquestionably horrendous crime of taking another's life.
The larger question, however, remains whether these women display some
uniquely unfeminine quality that made them more death eligible than other
men or women who committed the same crime.
Without looking at each of Rapaport's examples in complete detail, it
is helpful to consider four cases as relatively representative samples of the
types of factors considered in sentencing women. The first case involves
Karla Faye Tucker, a white woman who was sentenced to death in Texas
in 1984 for her participation in the murder of two Houston residents."
Tucker and her boyfriend Danny Garrett had decided to rob a man named
Jerry Dean."z Upon arriving at Dean's apartment, Tucker and Garrett
found Dean and his romantic companion for the evening, Deborah
115. See Rapaport, supra note 16, at 516-26, 531-51.
116. Seeid. at531.
117. See id. at 537. Again, it should be noted that these numbers do not include Darlie Routier.
118. Seeid. at 546.
119. Seeid. at 547.
120. See id. at 549.
121. See id. at 551.
122. See Tucker v. State, 771 S.W.2d 523, 525-27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988), cert. denied, 492
U.S. 912 (1989).
123. See id. at 526.
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Thornton, asleep."M Tucker and Garrett proceeded to use a hammer and
a pickax to murder both Dean and Thornton as they begged for their
lives. "  While these murders are certainly horrendous enough, it was
Tucker's description of the sexuality of the murders that seemed to seal her
sentence: Tucker explained that she got a "thrill" while "picking" Jerry
and that "every time she picked Jerry, she looked up and she grinned and
got a nut [orgasm] and hit him again.""
The jury had little trouble concluding that Tucker would continue to
pose a risk to society. In denying Tucker's appeal, the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals stated that it found ample evidence to support this
finding, citing evidence of Tucker's "turbulent past," her aggression, 27
and what Rapaport characterized as "her even more disturbingly
unfeminine manner of owning to the propensity with equanimity and
satisfaction."128 Rapaport observed that to the sentencing jury and Court
of Appeals, Tucker embraced a "two-fisted bad girl portrait of herself' in
defiance of every notion of femininity. 29 Rapaport speculates that it is
this image that put Tucker on death row, where she remains today.1'3
In the second case, Lois Thacker, a white woman from Indiana, was
sentenced to death in 1985 for hiring a man to kill her husband.
According to the court record, Thacker did not actually kill her husband,
but persuaded three men to shoot him.13 1 In considering Thacker's
appeal, the Supreme Court of Indiana focused its review of the facts on
Thacker's complete control of the three men in question, particularly
Matthew Music, who did the actual shooting." Thacker's sentence was
ultimately vacated when the Supreme Court of Indiana concluded that there
was insufficient evidence to support finding aggravating factors."
The third death-sentenced woman, Velma Barfield, was a white
woman who was sentenced to death in 1978 in North Carolina for the arse-
nic poisoning of her fianc6, Stewart Taylor. 35 Barfield was executed for
124. See id.
125. See id. at 527.
126. Id. at 526, 527.
127. See id. at 527.
128. Rapaport, supra note 16, at 535.
129. Id. at 553.
130. See id.
131. See Thacker v. State, 556 N.E.2d 1315, 1317-18 (Ind. 1990).
132. See id. at 1317; see also id. at 1323-24, 1326 (relating that Thacker lured Matthew Music
into shooting her husband by telling him that her husband had killed Music's best friend and was
pursuing Music's girlfriend).
133. Seeid. at 1317.
134. See id. at 1318, 1327.
135. See State v. Barfield, 259 $.E.2d 510, 518-19 (N.C. 1979), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 907
(1980).
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this crime in 1984 at the age of fifty-two.136 Barfield murdered Taylor
in an effort to avoid detection for having forged his signature on checks she
had written to support her prescription-drug habit.137  Barfield's case is
unique on the surface because despite her apparently miraculous rehabilita-
tion while on death row, she was still executed. 3 Rapaport theorizes
that Barfield fell victim to North Carolina politics more than her own bad
traits. 39 Barfield's execution was scheduled just four days before the
election day on which Jim Hunt, a Democrat, was attempting to win a
senate seat from Republican Jesse Helms."4 In a state where seventy
percent of the electorate was in favor of capital punishment and nearly
eighty percent favored executing Barfield, granting clemency was a politi-
cal risk Hunt was unwilling to take. 41 The media intimated at the time
that given Barfield's miraculous rehabilitation, she might have been spared
execution but for Hunt's political ambition. 4
The fourth case involved Shirley Tyler, a black woman sentenced to
death in Georgia in 1979 for poisoning her abusive husband. 43 Tyler's
case is significant not because of information raised in her actual trial, but
because in reversing her sentence, the Eleventh Circuit held that Tyler's
counsel should have introduced evidence that her husband had knocked out
her teeth and engaged in other abuse."4 In addition, the court held that
Tyler should have been allowed to introduce critical evidence of her ability
to provide for her family and of her good reputation as a wife and
mother. 145
Certainly these women all committed horrendous crimes, and like all
horrendous acts, these women's crimes were "unladylike." Just because
these crimes can generally be classified does not, however, divorce them
136. See William E. Schmidt, First Woman Is Executed in U.S. Since 1962, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov.
3, 1984, at A46 [hereinafter Schmidt, First Woman]; William E. Schmidt, Woman Executed in North
Carolina, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1984, at Al [hereinafter Schmidt, Woman Eecuted].
137. See Barfield, 259 S.E.2d at 522.
138. See Schmidt, First Woman, supra note 136, at A46 (characterizing Mrs. Barfield as "a deeply
religious person" who many advocates considered to exemplify a meaningful life in prison).
139. See Rapaport, supra note 16, at 540; see also Schmidt, Woman Executed, supra note 136,
at Al (noting that Barfield's family suspected that North Carolina Governor Hunt's political ambitions
kept him from commuting Barfield's sentence).
140. See Schmidt, First Woman, supra note 136, at A46 (noting that Hunt's election bid was
heated and that Hunt's reluctanceto grant Barfield clemency may well havebeen politically motivated).
141. See Rapaport, supra note 16, at 540.
142. See, e.g., Clemency Plea Weighed in Carolina, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1984, at A18; see also
Reston, supra note 10, at 82 (describing the Barfield's Christian beliefs which captured the affections
of her fellow prisoners).
143. See Tyler v. State, 274 S.E.2d 549, 551 (Ga.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 882, reh'g denied,
454 U.S. 1093 (1981), habeas corpus granted sub nom. Tyler v. Kemp, 755 F.2d 741 (11th Cir.),
reh'g denied, 765 F.2d 154 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1026 (1985).




from gender implications. The courts considered these women's ability to
conform to gender expectations in either initially sentencing them or
making decisions to commute or reverse their sentences." Karla Faye
Tucker performed a shocking murder, but apparently more disturbing to
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was the sadistic, sexual pleasure she
seemed to take from her murders as well as her unrepentant image as a
"bad girl." 7 In contrast, Shirley Tyler also committed murder, but she
was able to find relief in her weakened role as a survivor of domestic
violence."' These women suffer or benefit from their ability to conform
to anticipated gender roles. Although it may be impossible to separate
these gender expectations and roles from the crimes these women com-
mitted, the chivalry and evil woman theories would argue that these
women's death eligibility is based on a combination of traits not limited to
the type of crime committed or even the gender characteristics of the
offender, but more broadly considering her ability to conform to socio-
gendered norms. 49 In order to understand why 398 women have been
selected for death, their lives must be examined in the context of the power
implications of the penalty.
B. Conclusions About Power and Penalties
Placing the statistics and empirical data outlined above within the
context of traditional power structures indicates that women who are sen-
tenced to death are women who exist furthest from the collective center of
traditional social and female roles." Their racial or socio-economic
status preclude them from the protection of their sex long before they
146. This consideration of a defendant's womanhood is evident in the courts' opinions from each
of the four cases just discussed. In the case of Karla Faye Tucker, the court emphasized Tucker's sex-
ual deviance and her self-image as a "bad girl" in defiance of traditional gender norms. See supra
notes 122-30 and accompanying text. In the case of Lois Thacker, the court emphasized Thacker's
dominance and manipulation of the men she contracted to kill her husband. Again this image of a
dominantwoman controlling men runs directly counterto gender expectations of women as the "gentler
sex." See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text. In the case of Velma Barfield, the Court
focused on Barfield's torture by poison of her fianed in an effort to avoid detection for forged checks.
The judiciary expressed shock that Barfield would torture and kill the man who loved her. Again, the
notion that a woman would do this runs directly counter to traditional images of women as care givers.
See State v. Barfield, 259 S.E.2d 510,518-19,544 (N.C. 1979); supra notes 135-37 and accompanying
text. Finally, in the case of Shirley Tyler, it was Tyler's adherence to traditional female roles, both
as victim and good wife and mother that ultimately led to her sentence commutation. See supra notes
143-45 and accompanying text. In this sense, in each of these women's cases, though traits of their
crimes which were not gendered made them death eligible, the courts considered their ability to con-
form to traditional female traits in deciding their fates.
147. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 44-54 and accompanying text.
150. See Howarth, supra note 2, at 419 (noting that execution is a process of purging those least
like the rest of society).
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engage in crime because their poverty, race, or social situation makes it
impossible for them to conform to the social ideal of womanhood. These
women are the "margins" discussed by bell hooks,"' marginalized long
before they are criminals."' They probably neither vote nor wield power
in any traditional sense. Their power to influence springs from their mar-
ginalization coupled with their acts of violence or rebellion.153 It is in
their ability to stand outside of the boundaries of polite society that they
become truly death eligible. It is their existence on the fringe that is
sufficiently socially threatening such that, when they display outward signs
of nefariousness, they must be eliminated." They are a risk not just
because they are poor or uneducated, or even because they are of a low
social class, but because they defy society's traditional image of woman-
hood with a combination of their violence and their marginality. 55 Their
death sentences are a means to define the boundaries which they have over-
stepped and to require all other citizens to stay within the same boundaries
lest they risk a similar fate.
The chivalry and evil woman theories explain that executed women
lose the benefit of their sex, which was poorly connected to them in the
first place. The severity of their crimes, coupled with their social status,
places them farthest from the protected center of traditional
womanhood. 56 In this disjointed identity of womanhood, these women
rise defiant, violent, and unprotected, making them easy targets for exe-
cution both because they seem almost inhuman in their lack of traditional
femininity and because their very existence threatens to open the bound-
aries for all women. 57
Adherents to the two theories suggest that white society easily
executed black women and slaves for less than fatal crimes because these
women were more easily seen as nonwomen.15 8 Beyond this, the contin-
151. See BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO CENTER (1984) (defining margin-
alized women as women of low economicand social classes, often minorities, who exist outside of trad-
itional political spheres).
152. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
153. See Howarth, supra note 2, at 418.
154. See id. at 418 (reminding the reader that execution is merely the legal process through which
members of society "absorb and assume the power rendered by the execution").
155. See Brennan, supra note 47, at 62 (arguing that Ethel Rosenberg was executed not for her
role in the spy ring, which consisted of typing for her husband, but for "overstepping traditional female
boundaries").
156. See Howarth, supra note 2, at 417 (observing that feminists "are using as [their] reference
for 'women' white women who stay within defined class boundaries, act like ladies, and injure only
people poorer than themselves").
157. See id. at 414-16 (stating that women are seldom executed because, as compared to men, they
lack the ability to frighten and, therefore, are less easily disconnected from their humanity; when this
does occur, however, women fall outside of social protection and are easy targets for execution).
158. See ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST
THOUGHT 37 (1988). Addressing the ease of executing black women, Barbara Smith stated that
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ued existence of these women was threatening. How could a master guar-
antee loyalty, or even the safety of his family, if he allowed a rebellious
slave to continue to live? In a more modem setting, how can a polite
society enjoy peace and order if even its apparently most gentle members
cease to be gentle and commit unspeakable acts of violence? After all,
there is no incentive to execute women who can be explained away as one-
time actors or women who appear to return to more socially acceptable
female roles soon after they complete their crimes, thereby posing no risk
of future dangerousness. The crimes of these women, while certainly
lapses that warrant punishment, are brief. Their isolation and their
singularity threaten neither society nor its expectations of women.
Even an examination of these women in the context of the power
dynamics of the death penalty may still lead to the unanswerable question
of what makes these particular women the unfortunate recipients of the
death penalty? And does their gender make a difference? After all, men
and women are both sentenced to death for committing atrocious acts.
This is the point of the death penalty. Are there really characteristics of
"womanhood" that define and separate female offenders from their male
counterparts? In the empirical examples of Tucker, Thacker, Barfield, and
Tyler, these women clearly shared many traits with their male peers on
death row.15 9 They were poor, uneducated, and from a marginalized
social class. Yet, the evil woman and chivalry theories would argue that
these traits become gendered in the context of defining "womanhood."
They become defined in terms of poor women, uneducated women, and
marginalized women. Each of these traits help form their womanhood and
manifest themselves in particularly obvious ways in women's cases, as
opposed to men's cases. In order to explore the significance of these mani-
festations, it is necessary to place these feminist theories in the context of
emerging death penalty jurisprudence, which flows from the Eighth
Amendment's standards and articulated goal of nonarbitrary application of
the death penalty, and the larger sociological issues these theories raise
regarding the sociopedagogical role of the death penalty.
III. Constitutional and Sociological Implications of Feminist Theories
Applications of the chivalry and evil woman theories to the capital
system raise two distinct sets of issues. First, these theories call into
question whether it is constitutionally permissible for judges and juries to
consider the defendant's feminine traits, or lack thereof, in deciding her
"[wihen you read about Black women being lynched, they aren't thinking of us as females. The
horrors that we have experienced have absolutely everything to do with them not even viewing us as
women." Id. at 37 (emphasis in original) (quoting Barbara Smith).
159. See supra notes 122-49 and accompanying text.
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death eligibility. Second, these theories raise larger sociological questions
regarding the state's articulated goals for the death penalty in light of its
role as a demarcator of social values. This Part of the Note seeks first to
explore the constitutional implications of women's images in the context of
the emerging body of Eighth Amendment capital jurisprudence. Second,
it seeks to examine the accuracy of the fit between the state's articulated
goals of justice and the realities of a capital system that may be unable to
separate constitutionally permissible and impermissible considerations of
female defendants in capital sentencing trials."w Finally, this Part
explores these constitutional questions in the context of the larger socio-
logical influence of the death penalty on women's lives.
A. Writing an Eighth Amendment Legacy
Prior to the Court's decision in 1972 in Furman v. Georgia, the death
penalty in the United States was applied on the unbridled whim of
juries, The results of this near standardless system of sentencing are
well documented in the disparate sentencing of people of color and the eco-
nomically underprivileged."62
Although the Furman Court was unable to reach a consensus, each
member of the plurality concluded that, under the system in place at the
time, the death penalty was rendered unconstitutional by its arbitrary and
capricious administration." Justice Douglas, in his concurrence,
observed that as long as sentencers were able to base their decisions on
160. An argument can also be made that impermissible factors may enter into thejury's consider-
ation of guilt in women's capital trials; however, this argument is beyond the scope of this Note.
161. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 253 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) (stating that
"[pleople live or die, dependent on the whim of one man or of 12").
162. See BARRY NAKELL & KENNETH A. HARDY, THE ARBITRARINESS OF THE DEATH PENALTY
82 (1987) (concluding that pre-Furman studies of the administration of the death penalty reveal that
in the South, nonwhite defendants were most likely to receive the death penalty; outside the South,
white defendants were more likely to have the death penalty imposed on them; and defendants convicted
of killing whites were more likely to be executed than those convicted of killing nonwhites).
163. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 251 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("It is the poor, the sick, the
ignorant, the powerless and the hated who are executed." (quoting RAMSEY CLARK, CRIME IN
AMERICA: OBSERVATIONS ON ITS NATURE, CAUSES, PREVENTION AND CONTROL 335 (1970)); id. at
293 (Brennan, J., concurring) (finding that "[wihen the punishment of death is inflicted in a trivial
number of cases in which it is legally available, the conclusion is virtually inescapable that it is being
inflicted arbitrarily . . . [and that] it smacks of little more than a lottery system."); id. at 309-10
(Stewart, J., concurring) (comparing the death penalty to "being struck by lightening" and concluding
that even beyond questions of race, the death penalty should not be imposed as "freakishly" and
"wantonly" as it was under pre-Furman statutes); id. at 313 (White, J., concurring) (stating that the
problem with the death penalty is that it is imposed so infrequently and with "no meaningful basis for
distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not"); id. at 350,
365-66 (Marshall, J., concurring) (finding that there was "no correlation between the murder rate and
the presence or absence of capital sanctions" and that "the burden of capital punishment falls upon the
poor, the ignorant, and the underprivileged members of society").
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whatever information they wished, there was no way for the judicial system
to control or monitor the criteria they used to hand down the penalty.1"'
Different juries could weigh different circumstances and evidence as they
saw fit, free of judicial control or consistency.1" While the Court did
not suggest particular considerations that would appropriately reduce arbi-
trariness, Justice Douglas did suggest that states should attempt to focus or
channel the sentencer's consideration around the theories of punishment
articulated by the state." In an effort to achieve this focus, the states
developed statutorily enumerated aggravating and mitigating
circumstances.167 In an effort to positively identify the requirements of
a constitutional death sentencing procedure in the wake of Furman, the
Court considered a series of five companion cases.16 These cases pro-
vided a sampling of the twenty-eight post-Furman sentencing schemes 69
and broke them down into basic categories: those statutes known as
"guided-discretion statutes," which required the sentencing authority to
weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances, 1" and those statutes that
employed mandatory sentences for defendants convicted of certain enumer-
ated capital crimes. t1
164. See id. at 254-57 (Douglas, J., concurring) (holding that valid capital sentences may not
result from unguided discretion, which spare the socially protected and impose death on the poor and
despised); cf. id. at 293-95 (Brennan, J., concurring) (suggesting that, absent clear standards, the low
incidence of the death penalty's imposition relative to its availability indicates that it is imposed arbi-
trarily).
165. See id. at 255 (Douglas, J., concurring) (asserting that jury discretion leads to selective and
inconsistent application of the death penalty).
166. See id. at 255-56.
167. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Let God Sort Them Out? Refining the
Individualization Requirementin Capital Sentencing, 102 YALE L.J. 835, 852-55 (1992) (book review).
168. The five cases decided on July 2, 1976, were Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976);
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
169. See Note, Discretion and the Constitutionality of the New Death Penalty Statutes, 87 HAPV.
L. REV. 1690, 1691 & n.6 (1974) [hereinafterDeath Penalty Statutes]. The five statutes reviewed in
the 1976 cases were FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.131 (West Supp. 1977); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1
(Supp. 1975); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (West 1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp.
1975); and TEX. CRiM. PRoc. CODE ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon Supp. 1975-1976).
170. See Death Penalty Statutes, supra note 169, at 1700-09. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 164, and
Profitt, 428 U.S. at 248, involved guided sentencing statutes.
171. See Death Penalty Statutes, supra note 169, at 1710-12. The enumerated capital crimes
included murder of a peace officer, murder of more than one person, felony murder, and contract
murder. See id. Roberts, 428 U.S. at 329, and Woodson, 428 U.S. at 286, followed the mandatory
sentencing scheme. Texas's scheme is unique. The Texas statute requires a sentencer to return a
special verdict as to whether the defendantwould be a "continuing threat" to the community if not exe-
cuted, whether the crime was committed "deliberately and with a reasonable expectation that death
would result," and whether the crime was "unreasonable in response to provocation." TEX. CRJM.
PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon Supp. 1973). Death is required only when the sentencer finds
all three conditions exist. Id.
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The Court struck down the mandatory sentencing schemes, concluding
that the constitution required consideration of individual culpability.1"
In Woodson v. North Carolina,1" the Court explained that mandatory
sentencing failed the Furman standard because it excluded "relevant facets
of the character and record of the individual offender or the circumstances
of the particular offense [and] ... the possibility of compassionate or
mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind."174
In the guided-discretion cases and in Jurek v. Texas, 75 while relying on
multiple rationales, the Court concluded that guided-discretion statutes
sufficiently channeled the sentencer's discretion to reduce the arbitrariness
of the death penalty within acceptable Furman levels. 76
With these five decisions in 1976, the Court raised the practice of
individualized sentencing from enlightened policy to constitutional imper-
ative, stating: "[I]n capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity
underlying the Eighth Amendment ... requires consideration of the
character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the
particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of
inflicting the penalty of death."" 7 The Court stressed the importance of
juries maintaining links between contemporary community values and the
penal system,"'8 and it established the constitutional right of capital
defendants to receive consideration of mitigating circumstances.179
Two years later, in a plurality opinion in Lockett v. Ohio,"° the
Court expanded this right to present mitigating circumstances, holding that
capital defendants must be allowed to present unlimited evidence pertaining
to mitigating circumstances and that sentencers must not be restricted in the
weight they can assign such circumstances."' Quoting Williams v. New
York," the Court noted that
where sentencing discretion is granted, it generally has been agreed
that the sentencing judge's "possession of the fullest information
172. See Roberts, 428 U.S. at 333-37; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303-05.
173. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
174. Id. at 304.
175. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
176. See id. at 268-77; Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 247-58 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 196-207 (1976).
177. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality
opinion)).
178. See id. at 295.
179. See id. at 304.
180. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
181. Id. at 604-05. The Court concluded that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments required
that the sentencer "not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a
defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers
as a basis for a sentence less than death." Id. at 604 (emphasis in original).
182. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
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possible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics" is
"[h]ighly relevant-if not essential-[to the] selection of an
appropriate sentence .... 183
Initially, in considering aggravating circumstances, the Court pursued
its nonarbitrary application goals of the Eighth Amendment by attempting
to strictly limit aggravating factors considered." While in general the
Court achieved this limitation of aggravators by requiring that such factors
be statutorily enumerated, in two landmark cases, Barclay v. Florida8s
and Dawson v. Delaware,'86 the Court set up specific exceptions to this
enumeration requirement both of which expanded the scope of available
aggravators. In Barclay, the Court held that the use of accurate and reli-
able facts that were relevant to "the character of the individual and the
circumstances of the crime" was constitutionally permissible regardless of
whether they were enumerated in the state statute. 3 In Dawson, Justice
Rehnquist, this time writing for the majority, held that there was no per se
constitutional barrier to allowing juries to consider a defendant's associa-
tions as an aggravating characteristic, provided such information was rele-
vant to the crime the sentencer was considering. 88 In both cases, the
Court justified its expansion of aggravating circumstances beyond statuto-
rily enumerated factors by claiming that these unenumerated factors pro-
vided a more complete picture of the defendant to the sentencer. 89
183. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 603 (quoting Williams, 337 U.S. at 247).
184. See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (reversing a death sentence where the state
failed to adequately circumscribe its definition of aggravating circumstances).
185. 463 U.S. 939 (1983) (plurality opinion).
186. 503 U.S. 159 (1992).
187. Barclay, 463 U.S. at 958 (plurality opinion) (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879
(1983)); see also id. at 956-58 (plurality opinion) (holding that it was permissible for the trial court
to consider the defendant's criminal record even though it was an improper aggravator under state law);
id. at 966-67 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that the Constitution allows consideration of nonstatu-
tory aggravators, in addition to statutory aggravators, so long as they are related to the character of the
defendant or the circumstances of the crime). In requiring this link betweenthe character of the defen-
dant and the circumstances of the crime, the Court requires that the facts considered be "constitutionally
relevant." The Court returned to this issue in Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990), and Clemons
v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990). In Clemons, like Barclay, the Court required that the state base
sentencing determinations on "reliable sentencing determination based on the defendant's circumstances,
his background, and the crime." Clemons, 494 U.S. at 749. In Walton, the Court noted that while
aggravators did not have to be mathematically precise, they did have to provide meaningful guidance
to the sentencer. See Walton, 497 U.S. at 652-54.
188. Dawson, 503 U.S. at 164-66.
189. In Barclay, the Court couched this "complete picture" notion in terms of establishing a link
between the sentencer and the community. See Barclay, 463 U.S. at 950 (plurality opinion). The
Court stated, "It is neither possible nor desirable for a person to whom the State entrusts an important
judgment to decide in a vacuum, as if he had no experiences." Id. In Dawson, the Court couched this
in the importance of providing the sentencer with as much information as necessary to make an
informed judgment about the defendant. See Dawson, 503 U.S. at 164.
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The final case that warrants consideration for its potential effect on
female capital defendants is McCleskey v. Kemp."t° The McCleskey
Court, in denying a discriminatory application claim based on statistical
evidence, held that the "Constitution does not 'plac[e] totally unrealistic
conditions on . . [death penalty] use.' 191 In many ways this conclusion
was foreseeable. Justice Marshall had warned in Barclay that the Court
could not long sustain the tense balance it had created between its judicial
goals as articulated in Furman and the realities of administering the death
penalty in cases following Furman." Still, the Court contended that just
because the application of the penalty was not perfectly equitable, as long
as it met a standard of "fairness," it could pass constitutional muster."9
Despite Warren McCleskey's extensive evidence that Georgia's death sen-
tence was applied disproportionately to black men, the Court upheld the
statute, concluding that "[a]pparent disparities in sentencing are an
inevitable part of our criminal justice system."" McCleskey further
required a defendant to demonstrate that evidence of disparate application
of the death penalty under the Furman standard must be demonstrated
through facts specific to the defendant's case. 95
These lines of cases establish modern Eighth Amendment juris-
prudence with regard to the death penalty. Furman articulates the goal of
nonarbitrary application."9 The pentalogy and Lockett define this goal
of nonarbitrariness in terms of virtually unrestricted mitigating circum-
stances, holding that defendants should be allowed to present whatever evi-
dence available to them to mitigate the effects of their crime."9 Gregg
further refines the Furman ideal by requiring statutorily enumerated aggra-
vating factors that force the state to channel and guide the sentencer's
discretion in an effort "to ensure that death sentences are not imposed
capriciously or in a freakish manner.""' Dawson and Barclay expand
this aggravating factor standard, holding that accurate and reliable facts, as
well as evidence of the defendant's associations that are linked either to the
character of the defendant or to the circumstances of the crime are constitu-
tionally permissible aggravators even if they are not statutorily enumer-
ated.' Finally, in McCleskey, the Court stepped the furthest away from
the Furman ideal of nonarbitrary application, holding that imperfections in
190. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
191. Id. at 319 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 n.50 (1976)).
192. See Barclay, 463 U.S. at 990-91 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
193. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 313.
194. Id. at 312.
195. Id. at 292-93.
196. See supra notes 161-66 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 167-79 and accompanying text.
198. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195, 192-93 (1976).
199. See supra notes 185-89 and accompanying text.
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the administration of the death penalty were constitutionally permissible as
long as a vague standard of "fairness" could be achieved.2 In addition,
the McCleskey Court held that defendants must demonstrate factual links
between their own case and the alleged disparate application of the
penalty."°
B. Furman, the Eighth Amendment, and Women
Despite the almost continuous process of expansion and contraction
that the Furman ideal has experienced over the last twenty-five years, the
Court has stuck firm to its position that nonarbitrary application of the
death penalty remains the articulated goal of Eighth Amendment juris-
prudence.' The Court's articulation of the evolving Furman ideal
affects every person entering the capital system, but it has additional and
unique implications for women's trials. The lesson to be drawn from
Furman and McCleskey collectively is that the death penalty affects diffe-
rent people differently. While both cases focus primarily on the sentence's
disparate impact on people of color and the indigent, their basic premise
is applicable to any group that possesses unmaskable social traits: judges
and jurors mete out punishment influenced in part by their social precon-
ceptions of the person they are sentencing.' In the case of female
defendants, gender traits may carry specific implications both in the context
of the unrestricted mitigating circumstances standard and in the context of
Barclay and Dawson's interpretation of the aggravating circumstances stan-
dard. Finally, female defendants may find themselves hard pressed to
bring claims of discriminatory application under the McCleskey standard
despite the appearance of the disparate application under both the miti-
gating and aggravating factors standards.
200. See supra notes 190-94 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
202. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 327-36 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280, 285-305 (1976) (both striking down mandatory sentencing schemes for their failure to -avoid
arbitrary application of the death penalty by failing to consider relevant character evidence); Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 268-77 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 247-60 (1976); Gregg, 428
U.S. at 196-207 (all upholding guided-discretion statutes as sufficiently channeling a sentencer's consid-
eration to avoid arbitrary application of the death penalty); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605-08
(1978) (requiring that sentencers be allowed to consider a wide range of mitigating evidence in an effort
to reduce arbitrary application of the death penalty); Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 956-58 (1983);
Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 164-66 (1992) (both requiring that nonstatutory aggravators
demonstrate some link between the crime and the trait to avoid arbitrary application of the death
penalty).
203. See supra notes 163-65, 190-95 and accompanying text. See generally DAVID C. BALDUS
ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY (1990) (examining sentencing and prosecution
trends among capital offenders).
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1. Mitigating Circumstances.-On one level, the goal of mitigating
circumstances case law is to answer the questions of how the legal system,
which claims a degree of objectivity, should take into account the back-
ground, character, and experiences of those on whom it wishes to impose
the ultimate sentence.' Is it possible for the law to systematically
confront what is personal? Is there legal relevance to troubled lives or
exemplary ones when deciding whether or not someone is sentenced to
die?205
Furman presents a mixed challenge to mitigating circumstances.
While proposing a goal of nonarbitrary application of the death penalty
made possible by "individualized" sentencing, the Furman Court did not
require a channeling of mitigating evidence in an effort to achieve
"individualization. " Indeed, to the contrary, post-Furman cases such
as Woodson and Lockett suggest "no substantive limitation [on the]
defendant's ability to present mitigating evidence. "'
This open standard has typically allowed mitigation evidence to range
from the defendant's age," to any history of mental illness or retard-
ation,' to physical or sexual abuse,210 to substance addiction,211 to
evidence of an otherwise exemplary or terrible life,"1 to the defendant's
adjustment to life in prison.1 3 For women, these character traits necess-
arily include gender traits such as the woman's exceptional mothering
204. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 167, at 838-39.
205. See id.
206. See id. at 840 (arguing that Furman and its progeny require states to channel aggravation evi-
dence to reduce arbitrariness, but place no such restrictions on mitigation evidence).
207. Id. at 853.
208. See Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993) (holding that a defendant's youth is a rele-
vant mitigating circumstance under both Lockett and Eddings); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104,
115 (1982) (finding that the trial judge correctly recognized the defendant's youth as a mitigating
factor).
209. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 322 (1989) (holding that evidence of the defendant's
mental retardation was a relevant mitigating factor); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 370, 384 (1988)
(finding that evidence of the defendant's mental infirmity was a valid mitigating factor); Hitchcock v.
Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 397 (1987) (presenting evidence of petitioner's wandering mind as mitigating
evidence).
210. See Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115 (holding that evidence of a turbulent family history and physi-
cal abuse is an appropriate mitigator); Tyler v. Kemp, 755 F.2d 741, 745 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (affirming
a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel during the sentencing phase of trial for the attorney's fail-
ure to present mitigating evidence of physical and sexual abuse).
211. See Hitchcock, 481 U.S. at 397 (presenting evidenceof petitioner's substanceabuseas a miti-
gating factor).
212. See id. (presenting evidence of petitioner's poverty as a child and his good relationship with
his brother's children as mitigating factors).
213. Evans v. Muncy, 498 U.S. 927, 928-30 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting from the denial of
certiorari in an application for a stay of execution) (finding that the petitioner's good behavior while
on death row should have been considered in deciding whether or not to commute his sentence);
Skipperv. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4, 8 (1986) (holding that a defendant should have been allowed
to introduce evidence of good behavior while in jail as a mitigating factor).
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skills, her nurturing traits, or her devotion to her husband."' An excel-
lent example of the use of such traits can be drawn from the recent case of
Darlie Routier. Routier's mitigation evidence relied primarily on the testi-
mony of her husband, her mother, and herself that she was a good mother
who loved her children and was a good wife.2"5 Returning to the four
sentenced women considered in Part II of this Note, these traits are also
evident. For example, in the case of Karla Faye Tucker, in order to offset
an impressive list of aggravators, Tucker's defense team presented evidence
of her loving care for her dying mother and her virtual adoption of an
abandoned child." 6 In the case of Shirley Tyler, to offset her brutal
murder of her husband, the defense presented evidence of her own abuse
and forced submission to him.211
While under the 1976 cases and Lockett such traits are constitutionally
permissible,1 8 critics of this line of cases have argued that they in fact
are not true to the Furman ideal and open capital trials up to constitution-
ally irrelevant factors by allowing defendants to flood the sentencing phase
of the trial with whatever character information they deem relevant regard-
less of whether or not there is a nexus between the evidence presented and
a reduction of individual culpability.219 Indeed, the Court itself seems to
have begun to raise similar questions. In Boyde v. California,'° Chief
Justice Rehnquist seemed to draw a distinction between indispensable
aspects of individual sentencing and those that are constitutionally
irrelevant."5  In Skipper v. North Carolina,'  the Court also suggested
that there may be limitations as to what is constitutionally relevant in pro-
viding individualized sentencing.'
214. Arguably, men's mitigating evidence also has gender connotations, but it may not seem as
attractive because traditionally masculine traits such as aggressiveness or strength may be viewed as
indications of future dangerousness.
215. See Verhovek, supra note 10, at A7 (recounting testimony from the Routier trial).
216. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 167, at 837.
217. See Tyler v. Kemp, 755 F.2d 741,745 (11th Cir. 1985).
218. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Jurek
v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
219. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 167, at 840 (questioning how the failure to limit aggra-
vating evidence can produce arbitrary sentencing, but the unfettered introduction of mitigating evidence
has no such effect).
220. 494 U.S. 370 (1990).
221. See id. at 382 n.5 (distinguishing evidence of the defendant's artistic ability as it bears on the
defendant's future dangerousness, which Justice Rehnquist found constitutionally relevant, and evidence
of the defendant's artistic ability as an indicator of the defendant's intrinsic worth, which may have no
constitutional relevance).
222. 476 U.S. 1 (1986).
223. See id. at 7 n.2 (noting that there must be some limit on what is constitutionally relevant,
stating that "how often [the defendant] will take a shower" may be considered constitutionally irrelevant
(quoting State v. Plath, 313 S.E.2d 619, 627 (S.C. 1984)).
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In order to avoid this open market of mitigators, the Court should
ground its notion of individualized sentencing through mitigation evidence
in some substantive theory.' If no such grounding occurs, the sentencer
remains in a position of discretion to use impermissible factors such as
race, gender, or the lack of a defendant's adherence to a social stereotype
as a means to sentence. If states are forced to channel appropriate miti-
gating factors, they will also be forced to articulate theories as to who is
deserving of the death penalty.' This process of articulation will help
prevent sentencers from arbitrarily applying their own theories to the sen-
tencing process.
While this problem of unbridled mitigators certainly raises questions
for all death penalty defendants, for women it raises additional and distinct
questions. Women's trials rely heavily not only on gender-neutral traits
such as adherence to religion and self-sufficiency, but are also heavily
laden with gendered traits. If one believes that the mitigation phase of a
sentencing trial should be used to justify why a defendant should not be
executed, the use of traditional female stereotypes as a mitigating factor
justifies the life of the female defendant in terms of her ability to conform
to social standards. While this may be acceptable under Woodson,' it
is unclear whether it is acceptable under the Furman goal, which might
argue that being a good woman (or even being a good mother or wife) has
little to do with the capital crime considered, and in fact only increases the
risk that the sentence will be applied arbitrarily based on the sentencer's
preconceived notions of womanhood which may be inherently exclusive of
some capital defendants.
On a larger level, the use of such mitigators provides an indication
that what it means to be female and have a life worth saving requires at
least a semblance of conformity to traditional gender traits. In this sense,
the use of unrestricted mitigators may present a problem not dissimilar to
that which Furman sought to correct in the first place: those who are able
to appear most like the sentencer are likely to escape death, while those in
a less protected class-the poor, people of color, the uneducated, and the
socially deviant-are more likely to risk being sentenced to death not only
because their crimes are horrendous, but because they are not viewed as
falling within the curtilage of social protection.
224. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 167, at 853.
225. See id. at 865-66. Steiker and Steiker suggest that the appropriate theoretical basis would
be to require a nexus between the mitigating evidence and the reduction of individual culpability. See
id. at 845.
226. Woodson requires that the statute allow room for consideration of individualized circum-
stances. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976).
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2. Aggravating Circumstances.-Unlike the trend with mitigating cir-
cumstances, the Court initially required states to enumerate aggravating cir-
cumstances in their statutes under the Furman goal of nonarbitrary appli-
cation of the death penalty.2' Aggravators focus on the severity of the
offense and not the bad character of the person committing the offense. 8
In this sense, they serve to answer the question of whether the punishment
is proportional to the crime committed. 2 9 They do not serve an individ-
ualizing function; rather, they connect the punishment to the harm and the
social costs.' ° They do not seek to distinguish offenders, but rather
crimes."31
With the development of the Barclay and Dawson exceptions, aggrava-
tors were expanded to include reliable and accurate facts and information
about the defendant, such as his voluntary associations, that either had
some connection to the character of the defendant or provided insight into
the circumstances of the crime. 2 With this standard, the Court opened
a floodgate to the previous restrictions on aggravating circumstances.
The Barclay and Dawson standards of accurate and reliable facts and
voluntary associations would seem to suggest that general character traits,
including gender expectations, are constitutionally appropriate and relevant
aggravators both because they provide insight into the defendant's individ-
ual character and because they provide a connection between the sentencers
and community expectations and values. In fact, the Barclay Court stated:
We have never suggested that the United States Constitution requires
that the sentencing process should be transformed into a rigid and
mechanical parsing of statutory aggravating factors.... It is
entirely fitting for the moral, factual, and legal judgement of judges
and juries to play a meaningful role in sentencing.... [A]s long as
the decision is not so wholly arbitrary as to offend the Constitution,
the Eighth Amendment cannot and should not demand more. 3
The dilemma of this expanded aggravators standard is twofold. One such
dilemma was articulated by Justice Marshall in his dissent in Barclay. ,He
warned that in allowing nonstatutory aggravators to enter into a sentencer's
consideration, the Court created a greater risk that the defendant will suffer
under an arbitrary and capricious application of the death penalty.'
This concern was expanded by Justice Blackmun in his dissent in Tuilaepa





232. See supra text accompanying notes 185-89.
233. Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 950-51 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion).
234. See id. at 985-87 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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v. California. 5 Blackmun warned that under the Barclay and Dawson
standards of demonstrating a link to the circumstances of the crime, any
factor that would be a mitigator if present becomes an aggravator if
absentY 6 In effect, nearly any factor raised in a defendant's trial can be
used to prove aggravation under the Barclay and Dawson standards 23'
Blackmun warned that the failure to focus the sentencer's discretion around
guided aggravators leaves the sentencer free to "evaluate evidence in
accordance with his or her own subjective values." 8  This freedom,
Blackmun feared, would lead the sentencer to apply improper stereotypes
to defendants, returning the capital system to a pre-Furman capricious
application state 39
Under the Barclay and Dawson standards, particularly as accepted by
the Tuilaepa majority, social perceptions of women's roles and the senten-
cer's opinion as to whether the defendant adheres to these roles are appro-
priate considerations because they help ground both the defendant and her
crime against a backdrop of social expectation. The problem is that the
defendant's general character should not be the subject of aggravating con-
siderations under the Furman ideal.'
Again, in women's cases, this dilemma arises both on a general level
and on a gender-specific level. While women suffer the risks that every
death penalty defendant suffers of a nonchanneled system of aggravating
circumstances that may allow both general character traits and the lack of
a mitigator to serve as an aggravating circumstance, they also suffer a
gender-specific risk that their failure to be traditional women will make
them death eligible, when they might not be if they had appeared more tra-
ditional. This gender-specific risk is made especially precarious by both
the prevalence of gender expectations and the immutable quality of being
female. Women do not have to present evidence that they could have been
nurturing or a good mother or wife for the sentencer to conjure up such
images of women. Such images are already so saturated in society that
they are the very definition of womanhood." In this sense, women
enjoy only limited Furman protections under a system that may allow accu-
rate facts and associations such as the woman's abandonment of her child-
ren, her failure to marry, or her sexual orientation into the aggravating
235. 512 U.S. 967, 984 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
236. Id. at 990 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
237. Id. at 986-91 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
238. Id. at 993 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
239. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (expressing concern that improper racial stereotypes would
enter into the sentencer's decisionmaking process).
240. See supra notes 227-31 and accompanying text.
241. See Howarth, supra note 2, at 417 (stating that notions of "womanhood" are inherently linked
to gender stereotypes regarding women's characteristics).
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portion of the trial. In a capital system that bases punishment on the
existence of aggravators, such women's lives may well hinge on their abil-
ity to conform and to present a ladylike image.
3. The McCleskey Dilemma.-Despite the risk that women may face
constitutionally impermissible traits coming into consideration either as
mitigators or as aggravators, women may still have trouble proving their
claims under the McCleskey standard of proof.u2 While women may be
able to show that they risk disparate application of the death penalty as a
member of a group, the McCleskey rule is that proof of discriminatory
impact is not sufficient and that the defendant must show specific evidence
of discrimination that occurred during her trial.' 3 In light of the fact
that Warren McCleskey was unable to demonstrate this factual link despite
his well-documented evidence of discrimination in the very court and sys-
tem under which he had been sentenced, women may not fare better.'
Women, however, are in a slightly better position than Warren McCleskey.
Unlike McCleskey, who did not have any specific evidence of racism from
his own trial, women may be able to present evidence such as the prose-
cutor's use of the absence of gender-specific mitigators as aggravators and
the introduction of gender-specific mitigators in an effort to meet the
McCleskey standard of proof.
C. Larger Sociological Questions
These constitutional questions surrounding the use of gender-specific
mitigators, gender-specific aggravators, and the McCleskey burden of proof
carry with them implications for all women in the capital system.
However, such capital defendants and offenders are not the only women
affected by the capital system's reliance on gendered traits to determine
death eligibility.
Proponents of the evil woman and chivalry theories have argued that
the death penalty serves to define the outer limits of unacceptable behavior
for all women through its power to define social boundaries.'
Execution, they argue, is more than a single act, just as the death penalty
is more than a punishment. Each is evidence of what Joan Howarth refers
to as "the raw power of the law" to force conformity on the citizenry.'
242. See supra notes 190-95 and accompanying text.
243. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292-93 (1987).
244. See id. at 297 (refusing to infer from a study indicating racial disparities in the state's admini-
stration of the death penalty that "any of the decisionmakers in McCleskey's case acted with
discriminatory purpose").
245. See supra text accompanying notes 49-50.
246. Howarth, supra note 2, at 414.
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In order to be executed, the person must become an "objectified symbol of
powerful, inhuman evil." 7  Women are rarely able to achieve this
objectification of inhumanity, however, even when committing bad
acts . ' The very nature of being feminine is in opposition to this
complete separation from humanity and descent into unmitigated evil. 4 9
As long as women-even female criminals-maintain some sense of their
female identity, they are capable of receiving varying degrees of the
protection their gender promises. There is little, if any, incentive to
execute such women. Howarth writes: "Because executions are public
rituals by which the law-abiding population reclaims power from criminals,
the person to be executed must embody some kind of power. Executing
a woman does not feel sufficiently powerful for it to relieve us of much
anxiety about personal safety."'
For women to achieve this power to frighten, they must first transcend
both their humanity and their womanhood, breaking through their tradi-
tional gender expectations 51 They must become the Karla Faye Tuckers
and Darlie Routiers, women who appear either more like men or com-
pletely in opposition to womanly ideals. If these women show any sign of
returning to the female norm, push for their executions diminishes, often
to the point of commutation 52
The question these theories raise is how powerful the death penalty is
in curbing behavior. If so few women are executed, and the vast majority
of women will never be placed in a position where execution is a possibil-
ity, how powerful are the boundaries that the death penalty draws, if most
of us never even come close to them? Perhaps the power of the death pen-
alty stems from this scarcity, and its implications that to be a woman is to
be immune from the death penalty-to cease to act like a woman is to fall
outside of all protections.
247. Id.
248. See id. at 414-15 (stating that women are rarely executed because they are rarely seen as a
symbol of evil since (1) they do not have as much power to frighten as men do and (2) they are not
as easily separated from their humanity as their male counterparts).
249. See id.
250. Id. at 415.
251. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text. The tide to execute Karla Faye Tucker has
diminished significantly since her placement on death row. Moved by her apparent transformation,
even the brother of one her victims recently stated that she should not be executed. See Texas Set to
Execute First Woman Since 1863, N.Y. TIMEs, June 21, 1992, § 1, at 17.
Howarth argues that only women enjoy these unique benefits of the rehabilitation process. She
writes: "Men who find religion and lead decent lives on death row still carry with them the implicit
threat of their maleness." Howarth, supra note2, at 415. It is because the very nature of womanhood
is in opposition to the executable that women can more readily receive commutation of their sentences.




Images of women affect the administration of the death penalty on sev-
eral levels. First, the use of gender-specific traits as mitigators or
aggravators during the sentencing phase of the trial runs counter to the
Furman goal of nonarbitrary application of the death penalty by introducing
constitutionally impermissible factors to the sentencer. In addition, the
pervasiveness of gender expectations may well moot the necessity that they
ever be raised explicitly in order to influence the sentencer's decision. In
this sense, the presence of women within the capital system raises signifi-
cant questions about the possibility of administering the death penalty and
still maintaining the Furman ideal. Indeed, given the Court's claim that the
Constitution simultaneously requires nonarbitrary application of the ulti-
mate penalty and community standards to influence the death penalty, it
may be impossible to achieve both goals. The question becomes, is there
a level of arbitrariness in the application of the death penalty that we are
willing to accept?
In the lives of women, this arbitrariness revolves around questions of
their ability to conform to gender expectations. In the sentencing phase of
their trials, they are spared or sentenced based on their ability to fall within
the designated protective sphere of womanhood. For women who will
never face the risk of the death penalty, the sentencing system carries two
implications. The first, based on the scarcity of the penalty, is that they
may well enjoy some immunity because they are women. The second,
based on the execution of some women, is that the penalty is drawing
boundaries, even for those most likely never to be executed. In order to
enjoy the protection womanhood provides, women must not step over these
lines. Such restrictions are more specific than the general boundaries the
penalty draws around humanity. The reliance by the sentencer on gender-
specific characteristics suggests that traits such as motherliness, nurturing,
and weakness may protect even horrendous criminals from execution.
In many senses, these conclusions feel dissatisfying. The question
seems to repeat: even with the acceptance of the evil woman and chivalry
theories, what does it take to be executed as a woman? Unlike questions
of race, no single factor emerges from each case, but rather a conglomera-
tion of factors, which together indicate that women who are executed have
crossed gender boundaries, and those who are not, have not. A particular
woman's ability to cross a gender boundary may well hinge on her crime,
race, economic status, or sexual orientation, but these factors taken by
themselves are not enough. It is their combination that brings about death
sentences.
For feminists, these factors demand greater attention than they have
received to date. The death penalty is a system of raw power. For political
outsiders like women and minorities, it carries with it a ripple effect that
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expands through their whole experience. They walk a boundary that they
have no power to draw, or even to know when it will be drawn. In this
sense, feminists who claim concern over marginalization cannot afford not
to study women on death row. Despite their sparse number, women on
death row are powerful prisoners of the state and social expectations of
womanhood, and their very existence defines us all.
-Jenny E. Carroll

